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The EU securities market regulation is under a reform. The new Market Abuse Regulation (the MAR) was passed in summer 2014 
and it will come into force and replace the current Market Abuse Directive (the MAD) in July 2016. The MAR has been enacted as 
a regulation and it thus has a direct effect, i.e. it will be directly applicable in all Member States. The MAR will tighten the ongoing 
disclosure regulation, which means in practice that issuers are required to disclose more information than ever before. Most 
importantly, the MAR extends the obligation to disclose also to uncertain information relating to future events. Consequently, such 
a far-reaching disclosure obligation requires correction not to jeopardise issuer interests. Correction is provided by the delayed 
disclosure provision, the interpretation of which will be the hot question of the EU disclosure regulation in the near future. 
 
The delayed disclosure mechanism will serve as a safe harbour to issuers. However, entry to the safe harbour is strictly regulated 
by three criteria (i.e. legitimate interests of the issuer, misleading the public and confidentiality of the information) which need to be 
met in order to grant the access to the harbour. The interpretation of the criteria is a dilemma and a solution to it needs to be found 
to strike an optimal balance between disclosure and delayed disclosure. In other words, there is a conflict of transparency, 
favoured by investors, and confidentiality, favoured by issuers, and a balance between these conflicting interests is needed. 
Finding the optimal balance is not only in the interest of issuers and investors but also of the market in general, as disclosure is a 
key to efficient and well-functioning securities markets. The answer to the dilemma lies in how broadly or narrowly the criteria for 
delayed disclosure are interpreted, and this thesis thus focuses on searching for the optimal balance by means of interpretation.  
 
The thesis concentrates on the following research problems: 1) what is the current status of the disclosure regulation across 
Europe, 2) on what grounds may an issuer delay the disclosure of inside information, and 3) how should the disclosure and 
delayed disclosure be balanced i.e. what should the balance be between transparency and confidentiality? Discussing the first 
question lays the foundation for the thesis. The implementation of MAD in chosen Member States, i.e. Germany, France, the UK, 
Italy, Finland, Sweden and Denmark, will be discussed in order to map the current status of the disclosure regulation and the 
challenges that will be faced in the era of the MAR. Discussing the second question includes a thorough analysis of the criteria for 
delayed disclosure, the interpretation of which is the key to finding the optimal balance for transparency and confidentiality. Again, 
the practices adopted across Member States will be analysed in order to get an overall picture of the functioning of the delayed 
disclosure mechanism. Finally, the third question leads to the core of the thesis and to the proposed solution on how the conflict of 
transparency and confidentiality should be solved and how the disclosure and delayed disclosure should be balanced.  
 
The thesis contributes mainly to the EU securities market law, but interfaces to other fields of law, company and criminal law in 
particular, have also been taken into account. A pluralistic method has been adopted in the thesis and it contains elements from 
legal dogmatics, law and economics as well as from comparative law. Legal dogmatics is the core, whereas law and economics 
and comparative law bring perspective to the thesis and diversify the analysis. Further, a market-based interpretation method has 
been applied, which combines the teleological interpretation method typical for EU law and economic argumentation needed in 
securities market law. Using the market-based method in interpreting the disclosure regulation is crucial in order to take into 
consideration the market environment and the purpose of the regulation and to find an optimal balance for disclosure and delayed 
disclosure.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Topic, research problems and delimitations 
The EU securities market regulation is under a reform. The new Market Abuse Regulation 
(the MAR)1 was passed last summer and it will come into force and replace the current 
Market Abuse Directive (the MAD)2 in July 2016. The MAR has been enacted as a 
regulation and it thus has a direct effect, i.e. it will be directly applicable in all Member 
States3. The MAR will tighten the ongoing disclosure4 regulation, which means in practice 
that issuers are required to disclose more information than ever before5. Most importantly, 
the MAR extends the obligation to disclose also to uncertain information relating to future 
events. Consequently, such a far-reaching disclosure obligation requires correction6 not to 
jeopardise issuer interests. Correction is provided by the delayed disclosure provision, the 
interpretation of which will be the hot question of the EU disclosure regulation in the near 
future.  
The delayed disclosure mechanism will serve as a safe harbour7 to issuers. However, entry 
to the safe harbour is strictly regulated by three criteria, discussed later in this thesis, which 
need to be met in order to grant the access to the harbour. The interpretation of the criteria 
is a dilemma and a solution to it needs to be found to strike an optimal balance between 
disclosure and delayed disclosure. In other words, there is a conflict of transparency, 
favoured by investors, and confidentiality, favoured by issuers, and a balance between 
these conflicting interests is needed. Finding the optimal balance is not only in the interest 
of issuers and investors but also of the market in general, as disclosure is a key to efficient 
and well-functioning securities markets. The answer to the dilemma lies in how broadly or 
                                                          
1
 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market abuse (market 
abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission 
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC. 
2
   Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse). 
3
 Ojanen 2010, 41−42. 
4
 From now on, by disclosure I refer to ongoing disclosure. Periodic disclosure falls beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, chapter 2 which concerns the economic analysis of disclosure in general applies to both ongoing and periodic 
disclosure.    
5
 Schön 2006, 28. 
6
 Koch 2013, 288. 
7
 The metaphor of a safe harbour has also been used in this context by Gilotta 2012, 73.  
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narrowly the criteria for delayed disclosure are interpreted, and this thesis thus focuses on 
searching for the optimal balance by means of interpretation.        
This thesis concentrates on the following research problems: 
1. What is the current status of the disclosure regulation across Europe? 
2. On what grounds may an issuer delay the disclosure of inside information? 
3. How should the disclosure and delayed disclosure be balanced i.e. what should the 
balance be between transparency and confidentiality? 
Discussing the first question lays the foundation for the thesis. The implementation of 
MAD in chosen Member States, i.e. Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark8, will be discussed in order to map the current status of the disclosure regulation 
and the challenges that will be faced in the era of the MAR. Discussing the second 
question includes a thorough analysis of the criteria for delayed disclosure, the 
interpretation of which is the key to finding the optimal balance for transparency and 
confidentiality. Again, the practices adopted across Member States will be analysed in 
order to get an overall picture of the functioning of the delayed disclosure mechanism. 
Finally, the third question leads to the core of the thesis and to the proposed solution on 
how the conflict of transparency and confidentiality should be solved and how the 
disclosure and delayed disclosure should be balanced. The economic argumentation is used 
in arguing for the proposed solution.           
The described topic and the delayed disclosure mechanism in particular is an important 
research subject for at least two reasons. Firstly, the extending scope of disclosure will 
shift the main focus of the disclosure regime to the possibilities of delaying disclosure in 
the near future9 and the topic is thus extremely timely. Secondly, the previous research on 
the subject is scarce10, which must be due to the fact that the interest has only recently, 
specifically after enacting the MAR, shifted towards the delayed disclosure mechanism. 
Thus, the topic is definitely a burning issue at the moment and requires attention.  
                                                          
8
 Illustrative examples are also given of the US regulation when considered necessary. In addition, occasional references 
are made to other Member States, the regulation of which has, however, not been analysed systematically.     
9
 Koch 2013, 309.  
10
 As the chapter 4 will indicate, some discussion regarding the interpretation of the delayed disclosure mechanism can be 
found especially from the national legal practice, legal literature and authority statements of Member States. However, an 
EU level discussion is limited to only a few sources. See e.g. Koch 2013; ESME 2007; CESR/06-562b; EU Commission 
2009.  
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The disclosure regulation in general has mainly been discussed from either a national point 
of view or at the EU level. However, a comparative research that would take into 
consideration the national differences of the regulation and its interpretation is almost non-
existent11. This is surprising, since the true harmonization of the disclosure regulation 
across Member States requires understanding of the national approaches and practices of 
disclosure. As the currently effective MAD has been enacted as a directive having no full 
direct effect12 in the Member States, the securities market regulation in Europe has 
maintained its national characteristics. In order to enable truly harmonised practices and 
interpretation of e.g. the criteria for delayed disclosure in the era of the MAR, an 
understanding of the current status of the disclosure regulation across Members States is 
needed. This thesis aims at contributing to a development of such an understanding and 
creating a “common ground” that is required to enable a pan-European interpretation of the 
criteria for delayed disclosure and that would be acceptable across Member States. In this 
thesis, my goal is to distance myself from the Finnish perspective as far as possible13 and 
try to look at the regulation of different Member States as objectively as possible. Since a 
complete harmonization of the securities market regulation is targeted with the MAR, an 
EU law perspective adopted in this thesis is obviously justified.  
As the said indicates, the thesis is concentrated on the securities market law and the EU 
disclosure regulation in particular. In addition to disclosure regulation, the links to other 
fields of market abuse, i.e. insider trading and market manipulation, have been taken into 
consideration. The concept of inside information is crucial for this thesis but, nevertheless, 
the interpretation of its criteria has not been discussed in this thesis as they have already 
been covered by very extensive legal literature14. Besides securities market law, interfaces 
to other fields of law, company and criminal law in particular, have also been taken into 
account.  
                                                          
11
 See however ESME 2007; Di Noia & Gargantini 2012; Di Noia & Gargantini 2009; Koch 2013. 
12
 Directives require transposition into national laws and may only have a direct effect in limited circumstances. Ojanen 
2010, 42−44.    
13
 However, it is impossible to reject the Finnish perspective totally when it comes to e.g. criminal aspects of the 
disclosure regulation.  
14
 As a summary, see e.g. Knuts 2011, 25−114; Annola 2005, 208−305; Kotiranta 2014, 269−296.   
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1.2 Structure  
This thesis proceeds as follows. At the end of this chapter the methodology of the thesis, 
i.e. a combination of legal dogmatics, law and economics and comparative law, is 
described. As this thesis is rooted in the EU law, its doctrine of sources of law and its 
interpretation methods will be discussed shortly. The market-based interpretation method 
used in this thesis to solve the conflict of transparency and confidentiality will also be 
introduced.    
The second chapter will concentrate on the economic analysis of disclosure. The big 
picture will first be outlined by discussing the information asymmetries in the markets to 
which disclosure offers a solution. Disclosure, however, also causes problems, and thus the 
limitations for disclosure will be covered as well. Thus, both the pros and cons of 
disclosure will be dealt with from an economic perspective. The second chapter is by 
nature descriptive and summarising, and presented key arguments will be referred to 
regularly in the chapters to come.         
The third chapter will analyse the current and future status of the EU disclosure regulation. 
First, the disclosure regulation of the MAD and its implementation across chosen Member 
States will be discussed. The analysis indicates that the MAD disclosure regulation has 
been implemented in various ways in Member States and that the implementation 
approaches can be roughly divided into two categories, one-step and two-step model. A 
typology of the disclosure regulation of the studied Member States will be drafted, too. It is 
crucial to discuss the current status of the disclosure regulation across Member States in 
order to indicate the future challenges of the new disclosure regulation of the MAR, the 
content of which will be presented at the end of the chapter.  
In the fourth chapter a detailed discussion will be carried out on the delayed disclosure 
mechanism, the crucial component of the disclosure regulation under the MAR. The 
criteria for delay will be discussed in depth and the procedure and the sanctions for the 
delay will be covered shortly. Again, the understanding of the current disclosure practices 
of the studied Member States is crucial in order to provide a rational interpretation 
proposition on how the interpretation of the criteria for delayed disclosure should evolve in 
the EU, which will be discussed in the fifth chapter. 
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The fifth chapter starts by summarizing the major regulatory challenges of the MAR from 
an economic point of view. In other words it will be discussed how the MAR matches with 
the economic theory of disclosure presented in the second chapter. Then, an available 
solution is proposed on how to interpret the criteria for delayed disclosure and balance 
disclosure and delayed disclosure in a way that takes into consideration the economic 
aspects of disclosure. At the end of chapter five, practical implications of the disclosure 
regulation of the MAR and the proposed interpretation solution will be discussed shortly. 
The sixth chapter concludes the thesis.  
1.3 Methodology and perspective  
1.3.1 Pluralistic approach  
A pluralistic method has been adopted in this thesis and it contains elements from legal 
dogmatics, law and economics as well as from comparative law. Legal dogmatics is the 
core, whereas law and economics and comparative law bring perspective to the thesis and 
diversify the analysis.  
Firstly, as said, the core of the thesis is in legal dogmatics which aims at interpreting and 
systemizing legal rules (here the EU disclosure regulation), the first one being the core 
activity of practical legal dogmatics and the latter of theoretical legal dogmatics15. My goal 
in this thesis is to contribute to both branches of legal dogmatics by outlining the legal 
framework of disclosure regulation, discussing the relevant concepts and norms and 
organizing them coherently in relation to each other, describing the contents of the 
regulation, explaining the meaning of the described legal rules by interpreting them and 
finally suggesting solutions to the “hard cases” of the EU disclosure regulation. Legal rules 
do not always provide clear answers to such hard cases and the solution has to be searched 
from legal principles and, when they intersect, from weighting them against each other.16 
Legal argumentation is crucial in the practical legal dogmatics17, and therefore my goal is 
to justify my interpretations, that are based on the correct sources of law, in a way that 
could be accepted by the legal community.       
                                                          
15
 Aarnio 1997a, 75.  
16
 For the legal dogmatics doctrine, see e.g. Aarnio 1997a; Aarnio 1997b, 237; Timonen 1998, 12−14; Hirvonen 2011, 
24.  
17
 Aarnio 1997b, 51 & Aarnio 1989, 285.   
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Secondly, this thesis draws from the law and economics18 which is the prevailing doctrine 
in the interpretation of the EU single market regulation19 and which has an especially 
significant role in certain branches of law, e.g. company and competition law, and 
securities market law makes no exception. Ignoring economic arguments in such branches 
could even be considered a grave (procedural) error.20 Taking into consideration the 
economic environment of securities market regulation, it is quite clear that examining 
disclosure regulation in the securities market would not be meaningful without discussing 
also the rationales behind the regulation. As the disclosure regulation has a tight link with 
the functioning of the securities market, the link needs to be discussed in order to interpret 
the regulation in a meaningful manner. 
To be more precise, the approach of this thesis could be described as legal dogmatics with 
a law and economics twist21. By following such an approach the economic outcomes of the 
regulation are at the core of this thesis and my goal is to connect the economic 
argumentation to the interpretation, systematization and weighting propositions of the 
relevant legal rules and argument on how the regulation reaches its economic objectives 
(i.e. how efficient the regulation is) and how the interpretation of the regulation should 
develop in order to reach its targets even better.22 The described method may, however, 
conflict with the traditional, static doctrine of sources of law23. Therefore a more dynamic 
understanding of the sources of law has been suggested in the legal literature and also 
                                                          
18
 The US literature on law and economics is at the core of this thesis. For law and economics doctrine in general, see e.g. 
Posner 2007; Mackaay 1982; Cooter & Ulen 2014.  
19
 Siltala 2003, 527. For a more detailed discussion on the interpretation methods of the EU law, see chapter 1.3.3.  
20
 Mähönen 2004, 58.  
21
 For such an approach (in Finnish “oikeustaloustieteellinen laintulkintaoppi”), see Siltala (2003, 552−556), who 
considers the approach to derive from the Scandinavian social engineering doctrine (in Swedish “reella övervägande”), 
which connects law and its interpretation to the society instead of the legal system which is the core of the conceptual 
legal dogmatics.  
22
 The thesis includes also some regulatory critics, but such critics are not at the core of the thesis since the EU securities 
regulation has been reformed only recently and now the focus should be on how to interpret the regulation in a 
meaningful manner, not on how to reform the regulation again. For regulatory critics and de lege ferenda argumentation  
as another important approach on law and economics, see Siltala 2003, 554. 
23
 For the static doctrine of the sources of law adopted especially in the Nordic countries, see e.g. Aarnio 1989, 220−221; 
Tolonen 2003, 22−27; Siltala 2003, 200. According to this normative doctrine of sources of law the sources are divided 
into a hierarchy of strongly binding, weakly binding and permitted sources of law. The doctrine has been criticised for 
being strictly rule-base and for not accepting legal principles and case-specific arguments or taking into consideration the 
EU law. For the critics, see e.g. Siltala 2003, 201−202 and Mähönen 2004, 51. 
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adopted in this thesis24. According to it strongly biding sources, i.e. legislation and 
customary law, still have the highest position in the hierarchy25 but the weight of the other 
sources of law should be considered based on the case-specific circumstances, and also 
legal principles and other non-rule based arguments should be taken into consideration. 
Thus, economic arguments should, at the very least, be taken into consideration as real 
arguments or even as the most crucial basis for interpretation26.               
Thirdly, this thesis also has characteristics of comparative law. By following the 
comparative method, the aim of this thesis is to compare the relevant disclosure regulations 
of the chosen Member States, find similarities and differences and explain the potential 
reasons behind them. The goal is also to create a typology, which highlights the 
characteristics of each legal system.27 The purpose of such comparisons is to pinpoint the 
significant differences in the disclosure regulation, which the MAR aims at eliminating. As 
the legal cultures, systems and thus also the optimal level of disclosure differ28 in Member 
States it is all but easy to force an adoption of a uniform disclosure regulation. To enable, 
however, the adoption of a uniform regulation and its interpretation, the interpretation of 
the relevant provisions should be compatible with the legal cultures and systems of each 
Member State. The knowledge interest of the comparison is, therefore, integrative or even 
unificative29, i.e. the motive for the comparisons of this thesis is to find a “common 
ground” that could enable a pan-European interpretation of the relevant disclosure rules 
suitable to all Member States. In addition, the knowledge interest is also practical, as the 
goal is to find a practical solution to an interpretation problem regarding the delayed 
disclosure provision.    
                                                          
24
 See e.g. Timonen 1998, 122; Karhu 2003; Mähönen 2004. For a more detailed discussion on the sources of the EU law 
and this thesis, see chapter 1.3.2.   
25
 Legislation could, however, be surpassed with other arguments but only in the utmost exceptional situations. Otherwise 
the foreseeability of the law would be at danger.  
26
 Regarding the weight of economic arguments see Timonen (1998, 127) according to whom economic arguments 
should have a considerable relevance in evaluating interpretation alternatives or consequences of the regulation and in 
criticizing regulation. In actual court decision-making, however, economic arguments should have less relevance. 
Mähönen (2004, 63) on the other hand, has argued that the relevance of economic arguments should be extended to court 
decision-making as well.     
27
 For the comparative law method, see Husa 2013 (especially 25 and 36).   
28
 See chapter 3.1.4. 
29
  Husa (2013, 60) divides the knowledge interest of comparative law into integrative, uniform, contradictive, practical, 
theoretical and pedagogic.  
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1.3.2 Sources of law  
The EU law has changed the national order of sources of law30 in a way that it places the 
EU legal system and its sources over the national legal order31. The sources of the EU law 
may be divided into primary, secondary and supplementary law. Primary law has the 
highest position in the hierarchy and it includes the founding Treaties and the general 
principles of the EU law in this order. Secondary law is the next level in hierarchy and it 
includes legal acts, e.g. regulations, directives and decisions, based on the Treaties. The 
hierarchy within the secondary sources may be further divided into legislative acts, 
delegated acts and implementing acts in this order. Supplementary law includes the case 
law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and soft law.32 The main sources of this thesis 
are those of secondary and supplementary law.   
The EU securities market regulation is under change at the moment. The MAR has been 
passed and it will come into effect in July 2016. The MAR has been enacted as a regulation 
(it falls within the legislative acts category) and it will therefore be directly applicable and 
binding in all Member States33. As the MAR comes into force, it becomes part of the 
national legal systems without any actions of the Member States, it will have a legal effect 
independently of any national law and the Member States may not pass regulation that 
conflicts with it34. Therefore, this thesis primarily has the focus on the EU law. To be more 
precise, this thesis concentrates on the interpretation of certain disclosure provisions of the 
MAR, i.e. Article 7 on inside information35 and especially Article 17 on public disclosure 
of inside information and their recitals. The relevant preliminary works are also discussed 
when they provide further details on the purpose of the regulation. The MAD provisions 
and its implementation directive are also discussed when they appear to be still relevant in 
                                                          
30
 Supra note 23. 
31
 Timonen 1997, 115.  
32
 For the sources of the EU law and their hierarchy see e.g. Craig and Búrca 2011, 103−120; Weatherill 2010, 27−78; 
Ojanen 2010, 37−48; European Parliament 2014.   
33
 European Parliament 2014, 2. However, other securities regulation to be enacted in the future based on the MAR may 
also be given as directives which still require national implementation.   
34
 Craig and Búrca 2011, 105. However, Member States may need to modify their respective regulations in order to 
comply with the MAR. 
35
 Although, as said before, the criteria for inside information will not be discussed.  
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interpreting the MAR provisions. The ECJ case law, especially the Daimler case36, is also a 
relevant source for this thesis.               
In the future, the national legislations of the Member States will have only a limited role in 
the securities market regulation. Accordingly, the national legislation and related sources 
of national law, i.e. the legislation of Germany, France, the UK, Italy, Finland, Sweden and 
Denmark, are discussed in this thesis when it is necessary for justifying a coherent and 
appropriate interpretation proposition for the MAR from the Member States' point of view. 
None of the discussed national legislations is in a dominant position in this thesis but the 
legislation and implementation measures of the MAD in the chosen Member States are of 
equal importance and an extensive analysis of the regulation and relevant examples of the 
studied Member States are provided to justify the interpretation propositions of the thesis.    
When it comes to the EU securities market regulation, the Lamfalussy process also needs 
to be taken into consideration. The four-level Lamfalussy process was launched to increase 
the harmonisation of the EU securities market regulation and reach the Single Market 
targeted in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the EU, and it specifies the 
regulatory process and hierarchy of the securities market regulation37. Level 1 of the 
Lamfalussy process includes the legal acts by the European Parliament and the Council, 
e.g. the MAD and the MAR, which set out the framework for the legislation. Level 2 
includes legislation, i.e. delegated or implementing acts, by the Commission regarding the 
details and technical implementing measures necessary for operationalising level 1 
legislation38. Level 3 includes guidance given by ESMA (former CESR) on technical 
details and interpretation of the regulation39. Finally, level 4 includes acts of the 
Commission and Member States to strengthen the enforcement of the EU law.  
                                                          
36
 Case C-19/11, Markus Geltl v. Daimler AG.  
37
 For FSAP and Lamfalussy process, see e.g. ESME 2007, 2−3; Burn 2014, 4−8; Möllers 2010; Di Noia & Gargantini 
2012, 487−489; Di Noia & Gargantini 2009, 1−6; Häyrynen & Kajala 2013, 23−26; Moloney 2008, 16−24.             
38
 Four level 2 acts were enacted based on the MAD. One of them is relevant in this thesis: Commission directive 
2003/124/EC of 22 December 2003 implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the definition and public disclosure of inside information and the definition of market manipulation. No level 2 
acts have yet been enacted based on the MAR.   
39
 Three sets of guidance have been provided by CESR based on the MAD, and they will be discussed in this thesis for 
applicable parts. No level 3 guidance has yet been given based on the MAR. According to a prevailing opinion, Level 3 
measures are not legally binding but they guide measures of the national regulators to whom they are directed. However, 
some scholars argue these measures should be considered to have a binding effect. See Di Noia & Gargantini 2012, 488; 
Möllers 2010.      
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The legal literature clearly falls within the category of supplementary sources of the EU 
law, even though it is not generally mentioned in the hierarchy of the EU law, and like soft 
law the legal literature is of unbinding nature but may gain significance in developing the 
interpretation of the EU law40. The legal literature discussed in this thesis primarily regards 
disclosure regulation, inside information and development of the EU securities market 
regulation. Literature regarding the legislation of the studied Member States has also been 
taken into consideration. In addition, the economic literature on disclosure, information 
asymmetries and securities market efficiency is discussed quite extensively and it provides 
important arguments for the teleological interpretation of the EU law discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. Literature regarding the EU law in general and methodology, on 
the other hand, serves a supplementary source for this thesis.              
1.3.3 Interpretation methods  
After the entry into force of the MAR only the European doctrine should be applied in the 
interpretation of the disclosure regulation instead of national methods of interpretation41. 
The interpretation methods of the EU law have been developed by the ECJ case law, legal 
academics and legal practice to ensure the independence of the EU law from national 
legislation and the uniform interpretation across Member States even though they mainly 
consist of the methods also used in the Member States42.  
There are several interpretation methods in the EU law and no specific order of importance 
may be given to them. The method of textual interpretation is, however, a clear starting 
point for interpretation, according to which the wording of a provision is first examined 
and different language versions are compared. The method of contextual interpretation 
places a single provision to a larger context, takes into consideration the EU law as a whole 
and aims at eliminating conflicts within the legal system. Contextual interpretation has 
only recently started to gain importance in the securities market regulation as the full 
codification of EU legislation in the field is only emerging. The method of contextual 
                                                          
40
 For the soft law, see Ojanen 2010, 48. The prevailing European doctrine construes narrowly the concept of the sources 
of law. According to this view the sources of law include only those of binding normative nature whereas other sources 
that may influence the law but are not binding (e.g. legal literature, case law and administrative practice) are only 
informative sources. Möllers 2010, 385−386.      
41
 Veil 2013b, 53. However, the securities regulation enacted as directives (e.g. the sanctions directive to be discussed in 
chapter 4.3) may still be interpreted according to the national methods, taking however into account the principle of 
conform-interpretation and indirect effect of the EU law. See e.g. Weatherill 2010, 143−153 and case 14/83, Von Colson 
and Kamann.   
42
 Veil 2013b, 54. For the interpretation methods of the EU law see Veil 2013b, 55−58 and Ojanen 2010, 48−51.  
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interpretation is closely related to the method of teleological interpretation43 which aims at 
interpreting a provision according to its spirit and purpose. The method takes into 
consideration the outcomes of the interpretation and the development of the EU law 
towards its general purposes. Teleological interpretation has a central role in the EU law 
and it is connected to the principle of effet utile according to which the EU law should be 
interpreted in a manner that ensures it the best possible effectiveness.44     
Even though textual and also contextual interpretation provide a clear starting point for 
interpretation, it is clear that such methods do not provide a clear-cut interpretation for the 
disclosure provisions. That is because disclosure provisions are outcome-focused and open 
standards and they do not include any detailed rules that would provide a univocal answer 
to the interpreter of the law. Therefore, teleological method, which adds weight to the 
principles and real arguments45, is needed. Such flexibility in interpretation is justified in 
the securities market regulation as the market environment is dynamic and under constant 
development46 and the regulation needs to be adaptable to changing conditions. The 
disclosure regulation that is based on open standards and principles47 leaves discretion to 
authorities and courts and enables them to take into consideration the case-specific 
circumstances, too. However, such a regulatory approach also contains risks. Due to the 
open nature of the provisions, the legal security and foreseeability of the regulation 
suffers48. Disclosure regulation includes penal provision, both administrative and criminal, 
and therefore the principle of legality49 sets the ultimate limits for the interpretation.  
                                                          
43
 A historical interpretation method, taking into consideration the preliminary works and then the intentions of the 
legislative bodies described in the recitals of the legislative act, is often described as a separate method, but here it is 
considered to be embedded in the teleological method. See Veil 2013b, 56−57; Ojanen 2010, 48.    
44
 The interpretation methods of the EU law were established in the ECJ preliminary ruling in case C-283/81, CILFIT v. 
Ministero della Sanità. For the methods, see also Ojanen 2010, 48−51; Veil 2013b, 54−58; Itzcovich 2009 and Raitio 
2005. 
45
 Kurenmaa 2003, 72−73.  
46
 Häyrynen 2007, 838.  
47
 As an example, the UK financial supervisory authority FCA has explicitly engaged in such a principle based 
regulation, see FCA 2007. 
48
 See e.g. Häyrynen 2007, 838 and Kurenmaa 2003, 71 who have criticised the far-reaching flexibility of the definition 
of the inside information for colliding with the principle of legality. The same critics also apply to the flexibility of the 
criteria for delayed disclosure.  
49
 It has become established that the principle of legality consists of four sub-principles. Firstly, the principle of non-
retroactivity prohibits a judge to impose a criminal sanction on an act that was not criminalised at the moment of the act.  
Secondly, the prohibition against analogy prohibits the judge to apply the law analogically to the detriment of a 
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As far as the principle of legality is taken into consideration, the teleological method 
should be used in interpreting the disclosure regulation. Teleological interpretation has 
gained a particularly significant position in advancing the economic objectives of the EU50. 
A teleological interpretation method used within the economic context may be called a 
market-based method51, and such an interpretation method will also be used in this thesis, 
without forgetting the textual and conceptual interpretation as a basis. Using the market-
based method in interpreting the disclosure regulation is crucial in order to take into 
consideration the market environment and the purpose of the regulation and to find an 
optimal balance for disclosure and delayed disclosure. Otherwise the regulation might end 
up in either over or under regulating disclosure52.  
As said, the teleological market-based method gives significant emphasis on principle-
based argumentation. Principles can be described as discretionary optimizing commands, 
and often several, colliding principles apply to a specific situation. Therefore, principles 
need to be weighed against each other and balanced in a way that takes into consideration 
the (colliding) values and objectives behind the principles as far as possible.53 Within the 
context of disclosure, interpretation constantly needs to balance between the ideals of 
transparency and confidentiality54. Issuer interests favour confidentiality and investor 
interests transparency. Thus, issuer's right to proprietary information and investor's right to 
disclosure collide, which will be discussed more in detail in chapter 2.3. For the interpreter 
of the law, such a collision means that the trade-off between benefits and harm55 of 
disclosure needs to be discussed in order to find a solution to where the line between 
disclosure and delayed disclosure should be drawn.                     
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
defendant. Thirdly, the principle of certainty prohibits legislator to enact inaccurate criminal sanctions. Fourthly, the 
prohibition against uncodified criminal provisions prohibits unwritten criminal provisions. See Tapani 2002, 940.   
50
 Raitio 2005, 279. 
51
 See Knuts 2011, 12−21 who has applied such a method in interpreting insider regulation.    
52
 Knuts 2011, 13.  
53
 Hirvonen 2011, 44; Siltala 2003, 497.  
54
 Similarily, see Huovinen 2004, 354 and Häyrynen 2009, 75−76.  
55
 The concepts of benefits and harm of disclosure will be used in this thesis instead of the traditional cost-benefit 
framework. Harm-benefit framework will be used since disclosure can result also in non-quantitative consequences. For 
example in a multi-stage decision-making process, a premature disclosure of inside information may result in a failure in 
negotiations but also in problems in future co-operation relationship and image problems, which in turn may result in 
costs but also in intangible harm.        
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2 DISCLOSURE56 AT THE SECURITIES MARKET 
2.1 Information asymmetries  
The classic challenge of the economy and primary role of securities markets is the optimal 
allocation of savings to investment opportunities57 (hereinafter the efficiency problem). In 
an ideal situation, the securities market would work according to the efficient capital 
market hypothesis (ECMH)58, where prices would reflect all relevant information and 
guide investors to allocate their savings in a most efficient manner and in a way that best 
matches with their preferences. In such a perfectly efficient market59 there would be no 
informational asymmetries between issuers and investors and the allocation of resources 
would be optimal.  
Because of market failures60, however, securities markets are not perfectly efficient. Perfect 
efficiency is only an unrealistic and impossible fiction, and in reality securities markets 
face extensive information asymmetries and often present only a very low degree of 
transparency61. Matching savings and investment opportunities faces thus two problems62. 
Firstly, issuers are better informed than investors of the investment opportunities they offer 
                                                          
56
 In this chapter, the term disclosure refers exceptionally to disclosure in general and no difference is made on periodic 
and ongoing disclosure obligation.   
57
 Fama 1970, 383; Healy & Palepu 2001, 407; Avgouleas 2005, 4.  
58
 The hypothesis was introduced by Fama (1970). According to the hypothesis, securities  markets can be said to be 
efficient when the security prices fully reflect all available information at any time. This has been called the null 
hypothesis of the theory and it represents therefore an unrealistic, extreme situation. Therefore, securities market 
efficiency has been divided into three forms − weak, semi-strong and strong form. In the weak form of efficiency, prices 
on securities markets reflect only the historical information. In the semi-strong form of efficiency, prices reflect all 
published, both past and present, information. In the strong form of efficiency, prices reflect all relevant information 
whether it is public or not. See also Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 5. For the later development and critics of the theory, see 
e.g. Gilson & Kraakman 1984; Gilson & Kraakman 2003, Gilson & Kraakman 2012, Grossman & Stiglitz 1980 and 
Tversky & Kahneman 1974. Gilson & Kraakman (2003, 45) point out that the ECMH was a product of an era of “elegant 
models of the workings of the capital markets in a frictionless world” from where we have moved on to understanding 
how the market works in an imperfect world. This more realistic understanding has been promoted by academics 
representing behavioural economics and finance, as a summary, see Knuts 2007, 48−55.    
59
 In a perfectly efficient market e.g. competition would be perfect, there would be no frictions (i.e. transactions costs or 
market restrictions), individuals would be perfectly rational and information would be immediately and costlessly 
available to everyone. Avgouleas 2005, 45, footnote 120.     
60
 E.g. the fact that information asymmetries exist, information is imperfect and costly, information is a public good by 
nature and externalities are related to it (Stiglitz 1989; Bator 1958). 
61
 Avgouleas 2005, 54. Some scholars have argued that the securities markets would work according to the semi-strong 
form, but this view has also been criticised by stating that markets do not represent even the weak form. For the Finnish 
empirical evidence, see Norros 2009, 226−227 and Leppiniemi 2005, 117.  
62
 Healy & Palepu 2001, 407. 
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to investors. This is called an information problem and it arises from the information 
asymmetries that exist between issuers and investors. Secondly, issuers remain better 
informed also after investors have decided to invest and have become shareholders. This is 
called an agency problem and it arises also from information asymmetries which create 
incentives to issuers to use the investments in their own interest and at the expense of 
investors.63 
An information problem may result in significant inefficiencies and even a breakdown of 
the market which has been explained by the classic lemon theory64. If information 
asymmetries exist, buyers can by no means evaluate the quality of marketed goods. 
Therefore, there is no incentive to offer quality goods in the market as buyers cannot tell 
the difference between those and inferior goods and they value both at an average level. 
Inferior goods are thus overvalued and quality goods undervalued which keeps producers 
of quality products away from the market as the prices for their goods are too low. Finally, 
through a process of adverse selection, inferior goods, i.e. lemons, are left in the market. 
Consequently, in a lemon market there is no confidence in the market and market integrity 
is low.  
Similarly to the information problem, an agency problem may result in significant 
inefficiencies. In a classic principal-agent65 set-up the agent, i.e. management of a 
company, is better informed than the principal, i.e. a shareholder of the company. 
Therefore, the principle may not be sure that the agent acts as agreed, and the agent has an 
incentive to act opportunistically. The value of the agent's performance to the principal is 
reduced as the principal needs to engage in monitoring which involves agency costs. 
Regulation, i.e. disclosure obligation, may significantly decrease the agency costs and 
advance the welfare of both agents and principals.    
                                                          
63
 The underlying rationales for regulating information asymmetries may be divided into market-based theories and 
relationship-based theories. Information problem relates to the market-based approach to information asymmetries and it 
has a macro focus on market efficiency. Agency problem, on the other hand, relates to the relationship-based approach to 
information asymmetries and it has a micro focus on fiduciary relationship. The EU disclosure regime has been based on 
the macro focus, whereas the US regime has its roots on the micro focus. See Moloney 2014, 701.    
64
 Akerlof's (1970) lemon theory was not developed for securities markets in the first place, but it has however 
established its position in the Nordic securities law literature. However, the German literature does not refer to the theory. 
See Knuts 2011, 17. For the application of the theory to securities markets, see also Healy & Palepu 2001, 408 and Lau 
Hansen 2002, 7−8.     
65
 For the principal-agent theory, see e.g. Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman 2009b, 35−53. 
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2.2 Disclosure as a solution 
Information asymmetries are inevitable in the securities markets and create a demand for 
disclosure66. Disclosure is needed to enhance efficiency and to balance the information 
asymmetries between issuers and investors. In other words, disclosure provides a solution 
to efficiency, information and agency problem discussed in the previous chapter. In the 
legal and economic literature, the justifications for disclosure have been divided into three 
categories67: 1) efficiency justification (addressing the efficiency problem), 2) fairness 
justification (addressing the information problem) and 3) corporate governance 
justification (addressing the agency problem). There is no consensus on which one of them 
is the soundest justification for disclosure, but the efficiency justification may be argued to 
be the ultimate rationale and the “umbrella” for the two others as they both are linked with 
efficiency, as well.  
According to the first justification, disclosure addresses the need to improve the securities 
market efficiency68 as it has the potential to enhance price accuracy by disseminating 
relevant information and thus enabling information-based decision-making69. Enhanced 
price accuracy, in turn, benefits the whole economy as it increases liquidity, reduces 
volatility, decreases cost of capital (i.e. the risk premium required by the investors) and 
                                                          
66
 Healy & Palepu 2001, 406. Disclosure is not the only way to reduce information asymmetries. Instead, alleviating 
information asymmetries by regulation has traditionally been achieved in three ways. The first measure is to oblige the 
informed party, i.e. the issuer, to disclose relevant information and thus eliminate the monopoly on information, and in 
the securities market regulation it is achieved by disclosure obligation. The second measure is to prohibit the informed 
party from making use of informational advantage, and in the securities market regulation it is achieved by prohibition on 
insider dealing. The third measure is to prevent the creation of new information asymmetries by prohibiting active 
misinformation, in other words lying, and in the securities market regulation it is achieved by prohibition on market 
manipulation. The first two, disclosure obligation and prohibition on insider dealing are often seen as supplementary to 
each other, since both prevent taking advantage of the information advantage. On the other hand, the first and the third 
are tightly related when it comes to communication: disclosure obligation enforces the issuer to disclose relevant 
information and prohibition on market manipulation forbids the issuer to disclose false information. Lau Hansen 2002, 
248. Even though the disclosure obligation is in the focus of this thesis, all these three intertwine and require therefore 
certain attention.  
67
 See e.g. Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 4−12. According to them the justifications for disclosure are: a) price accuracy 
enhancement, b) investor protection and c) agency cost reduction. Price accuracy enhancement addresses the efficiency 
problem, investor protection the information problem and agency cost reduction the agency problem. 
68
 For the efficiency justification of insider dealing regulation, see e.g. Kurenmaa 2003, 28−31 and Knuts 2011, 16−18. 
Based on the efficiency justification it has even been suggested that insider trading should not be regulated at all. 
Allowing insider dealing would also mean that no mandatory disclosure regulation would be needed. Manne's works have 
been especially influential in this discussion; as a summary, see Sjödin 2006, 19−26; Avgouleas 2005, 200−201 and 
Knuts 2011, 16, footnote 33.       
69
 Thus, by following the ECMH, disclosure serves the purpose of pursuing a more efficient form of the securities market 
efficiency.  
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promotes allocative efficiency70. According to the second justification, disclosure addresses 
the information problem by protecting investors. Investors are not protected just because of 
fairness or justice71 but because investor protection is instrumental to the well-functioning 
and even the very existence of the securities market72. As the lemon theory indicates, 
scepticism among market actors results in lack of confidence, trust and market integrity, 
which, in turn, may result in investors withdrawing their savings and, finally, in a 
breakdown of the market. To retain investors in the market and avoid the collapse of the 
market, at least the minimum level of “equal access”73 needs to be assured. Thus, the 
fairness justification can also be traced to the efficiency justification and the efficiency and 
fairness justifications are not necessarily contradictory74. According to the third 
justification, disclosure has an important role in corporate governance75 and it addresses the 
agency problems by reducing agency costs and lowering the cost of capital76. Disclosure 
enables the shareholders to monitor that the management acts according to its fiduciary 
duties and it also increases transparency, prevents opportunism and misbehaviour of both 
management and controlling shareholder. Therefore, disclosure has been said to be 
instrumental to shareholder empowerment.77  
In theory, disclosure may be achieved by either voluntary or mandatory disclosure, i.e. 
disclosure may be either non-regulated or regulated. Efficiency justification has been used 
to support both alternatives and it has even been argued that exploiting information 
                                                          
70
 Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 10; Kahan 1992; Diamond & Verrecchia 1991; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000.  
71
 Some scholars have argued that insider trading should be prohibited only because it is immoral, unfair and unethical 
regardless of its possible economic disadvantages or advantages. See e.g. Keenan 2000 and Snoeyenbos & Smith 2000. 
For the fairness justification of insider dealing regulation, see also e.g. Kurenmaa 2003, 31−33 and Knuts 2011, 19−21. 
Both fairness and efficiency justification have been discussed extensively in the literature. The fairness justification has 
been strongly supported by lawyers, whereas the efficiency justification has been supported by economists (Kurenmaa 
2003, 33). It has also been argued that the fairness justification should be discarded per se and that the fairness 
justification is justified only as far as it contributes to better efficiency as well (Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 4−5; Sjödin 
2006, 19−28).  
72
 Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 4. 
73
 Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 5. See also infra note 87. 
74
 Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 4; Kurenmaa 2003, 34; Sjödin 2006, 26. 
75
 The corporate governance justification has been especially important in the US practice which emphasises the 
management's fiduciary duties more than the European practice. See e.g. Fox 1999a and Mahoney 1995. For fiduciary 
duties in the Anglo-American practice, see e.g. Mähönen & Villa 2006, 4 & 108.  
76
 Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 7; Mahoney 1995, 1048; Fox 1999a, 120.  Reducing agency costs and lowering the cost of 
capital can, evidently, be traced back to the efficiency justification, as well (Mahoney 1995, 1048).   
77
 Fox 1999a, 116−118; Fox 1999b; Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 8; Paredes 2003, 2. Yet, scandals such as Enron have not 
been avoided. See infra note 83. 
17 (72) 
 
asymmetries should not be prohibited at all78. According to some scholars issuers would 
disclose the relevant information also voluntarily, as disclosure will reduce the cost of 
capital and it is an important way to avoid any discount that may result if the investors 
consider that the issuer does not disclose enough information for them to evaluate the 
company properly or if they think that the issuer is hiding something79. Despite the fact that 
both voluntary and mandatory disclosure have been supported in the legal literature, 
regulating information asymmetries by disclosure obligation has established its position in 
the Western countries and it has become an indispensable part of the securities regulation80.  
Mandatory disclosure has been supported by several arguments81. First of all, information 
is a public good and voluntary disclosure would result in too little disclosure. Without 
mandatory disclosure there would be less information than would be optimal because 
higher production and dissemination costs would lead to its undersupply. Mandatory 
disclosure subsidises and encourages research and analysis and reduces transaction costs of 
multiple parties producing the same information. In other words, mandatory disclosure 
enables centralizing and collectivizing information production, and it also standardises the 
format of disclosure. In addition, mandatory disclosure ensures there is no incentive to 
withhold negative information. Mandatory disclosure has also been said to be an easy tool 
for regulators. Disclosure does not usually require direct governmental expenditure82. It is 
also one of the few concrete ways for politicians and regulators to respond to corporate 
scandals83.   
                                                          
78
 As a summary of the extensive discussion, see e.g. Sjödin 2006, 19−26; Avgouleas 2005, 179−183 & 200−201 and 
Knuts 2011, 16, footnote 33. 
79
 E.g. Paredes 2003, 5 and Romano 1998, 2374−2375.  
80
 Knuts 2011, 16; Paredes 2003, 2; Kurenmaa 2003, 33; Gilotta 2012, 48, footnote 3. Thus, because of the established 
position of disclosure regulation, the question of whether disclosure should be voluntary or mandatory will not be 
discussed in this thesis.  
81
 See especially Coffee 1984; Fox 1999b; Easterbrook & Fischel 1984. As a summary of the main arguments, see 
Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 2 & 12−18 and Paredes 2003, 5.  
82
 Except for the costs that result from setting up such a system, see Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 3.  The MAR also results in 
monitoring costs which will be discussed in chapter 4.2 and 5.3.  
83
 Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 3 & Paredes 2014, 2. A good example is the disclosure regulation in the EU. The MAD was 
enacted in the aftermath of IT bubble and the MAR after financial crisis. Both times the disclosure regulation was 
tightened. For the link between corporate scandals (e.g. Enron and Worldcom in the US and Parmalat in Europe) and 
tightened regulation (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US and the MAD in the EU), see e.g. Huemer 2005, 1−2.   
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2.3 Limits for disclosure 
Today, there is a general consensus of the necessity and desirability of mandatory 
disclosure, as the concise summary of the previous chapter indicated. Instead, it is highly 
controversial how extensive disclosure should be. In theory, the possible scale of 
disclosure varies from full disclosure, through high disclosure and low disclosure, to non-
disclosure. The natural tendency of regulators seems to be towards expanding, rather than 
contracting, the scope of disclosure84. The assumption that more information is simply 
better than less in the securities market, which is also the underlying assumption of the 
ECMH, seems to be dominating85. Disclosure regulation has also in reality achieved a point 
where issuers are required to disclose more information than ever86. However, it should be 
acknowledged that there are also important arguments that go against expanding disclosure 
and support scaling back the disclosure obligation.  
Firstly, investor interests in disclosure and issuer interests in keeping certain information 
unpublished collide. According to the US doctrine, inside information should be 
understood in terms of property rights in information87, and from such a perspective, 
securities market regulation is regulation on allocating property rights to information88. 
Inside information may be considered to be corporate property and the property rights to 
                                                          
84
 Transparency is regarded as a synonym for prevention of opportunism and fraud. Legal literature has also often 
referred to a sunlight metaphor of Louis D. Brandeis from 1914: “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social 
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” See 
e.g. Gilotta 2012, 77; Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 28−29 and Paredes 2003, 2.  
85
 E.g. the EU regulation has been criticised from ever-increasing disclosure regulation which is driven by “an unfounded 
optimism of transparency” and “which does not take into account the regulatory waste”, e.g. information costs and the 
need to strike a balance between issuer's interest in confidentiality and investor's in transparency. See Schön 2006, 28. 
Actually, the objective of full transparency has been explicitly stated in the MAR (preamble paragraph 7) and in the 
MAD (preamble paragraph 15), according to which market abuse prevents full and proper market transparency. Such an 
objective appears, however, totally unrealistic as companies are far from being fully transparent and certain degree of 
confidentiality is inevitable (Gilotta 2012, 48).       
86
 Such seems to be the case both in US (Paredes 2003, 8) and in Europe (Schön 2006, 28). However, it is not only that 
regulation requires more disclosure than before, but also investors demand more and better information and modern 
information technology boosts the demand further. Thus, issuers also disclose voluntarily more information than before. 
Paredes 2003, 12.   
87
 See e.g. Mahoney 1997; Bainbridge 2000 & Bainbridge 2001. Such a doctrine has also been adopted by SEC in 
interpreting the Rule 10b-5 of the US Securities Exchange Act, who has replaced the equal access approach (adopted in 
e.g. SEC v. Texas Sulphur Co.) by a property rights approach (Chiarella v. United States and Dirks v. SEC). See 
Mahoney 1997, 844.  
88
 Mahoney 1997, 817. As a summary, see Avgouleas 2005, 200-201 
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information would therefore belong to the issuer89. Evidently, an issuer having in 
possession valuable information has an interest in keeping it confidential and denying third 
parties access to it as such access could harm the issuer90. Executing issuer's property rights 
to information requires thus confidentiality. Confidentiality is also a key for any company's 
competitive and strategic advantage as it protects bargaining power and company's 
competitive position against competitors. Resulting from the public-good nature of 
information, confidentiality is also needed to protect economic incentives to produce 
valuable information.91  
Consequently, disclosure can be seen as an exemption, although quite an extensive one, 
from issuer's property right on inside information, and it is obvious that there is a conflict 
between issuer and investor interests. Issuer interests favour confidentiality and investor 
interests transparency. Thus, issuer's right to proprietary information and investor's right to 
disclosure collide. The magnitude of the conflict depends on the overlap between the 
information that an issuer would desire to keep confidential and the information that 
investors desire to have for price determination92. Thus, the scope of disclosure should be 
determined based on the trade-off between benefits and harm accruing from disclosure. In 
such an evaluation issuer interests should be taken into consideration as a factor limiting 
the optimal scope of disclosure and they should not be superseded altogether at the expense 
of the investor interests and market efficiency, although protecting issuer interests93 has not 
gained similar attention as protecting investor interests.  
Taking issuer interests into consideration is crucial, since too extensive disclosure 
obligation would seriously harm the company's competitive advantage94 and the economy 
in general would suffer accordingly95. No company could create wealth for long if it were 
                                                          
89
 Bainbridge 2000, 78−82 & Bainbridge 2001, 17−20. From such a perspective, disclosure is actually an exemption from 
issuer's right to private information, and delayed disclosure, on the other hand, is as an exemption of an exemption that 
leads back to the issuer's right to private information. 
90
 Gilotta 2012, 48−50; Bainbridge 2001, 78−79.  
91
 Gilotta 2012, 49.  
92
 Gilotta 2012, 52. 
93
 See however an extensive discussion regarding issuer interest, Gilotta 2012. See also Lau Hansen 2002, 259, BaFin 
2009, 67 and ESME 2007, 5 who refers to “public good” instead of issuer interests.  
94
 For an extensive discussion regarding competitive costs of disclosure, see Schön 2006. See also Häyrynen & Kajala 
2013, 194.  
95
 It should be noted that companies and economy in general may suffer even if all issuers are in an equal position and the 
scope of disclosure obligation is of equal coverage to all issuers (which is one of the targets of the EU-wide disclosure 
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to disclose all its private information96, which would lead to reduced willingness of 
companies to be listed at all97. Companies might also end up changing or abandoning 
profitable projects, plans or strategies if they cannot be developed in secrecy. The 
premature or too detailed disclosure of such projects, plans or strategies enhances the 
competitor's free riding and may render previously profitable actions less attractive or even 
unprofitable.98 In addition, the lack of confidentiality would discourage the production of 
new information and innovation, which, in turn, would prevent technology development 
and efficient use of resources99. 
Secondly, extensive disclosure is not always in the interest of investors, either. It is clear 
that disclosed information is needed for the disclosure regulation to be effective but 
besides disclosed information, the efficient use of information is also needed. This requires 
investors to be able to effectively process the information; otherwise the disclosed 
information will be useless.100 The classic economic theories, e.g. ECMH, rely on the idea 
of a frictionless world, where investors are assumed to be perfectly rational market 
actors101, which is represented by the concept of homo economicus102. The concept 
represents an assumption that investors are able to take into consideration all relevant 
information, and thus broadening disclosure obligation would univocally improve 
efficiency, as well. However, this classic assumption has been challenged by investor 
psychology and behavioural economics and finance103 and by the fact that investors are 
only boundedly rational which means that investors104 have limited information-processing 
                                                                                                                                                                                
regulation). Thus, even though competitive harm occurs equally to each company and all can benefit advantages of 
competitor free riding, after a certain threshold, disclosure generates an equilibrium of paralysis by removing the first-
mover advantages, and passivity and waiting become more attractive strategies for companies instead of innovating and 
producing new information. For a more detailed discussion, see Gilotta 2012, 67−68.  
96
 Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 19. 
97
 Di Noia & Gargantini 2012, 528.  
98
 Easterbrook & Fischel 1984, 708; Enriques & Gilotta 2014, 27−28. 
99
 Lau Hansen 2002, 249. 
100
 Paredes 2003, 2.  
101
 For the rational-choice theory, see Posner 1997 and Posner 2007, 3−21.  
102
 Paredes 2003, 3; Mackaay 1982, 119; Veil 2013c, 66.   
103
 See supra note 58.  
104
 However, investors are different in their information-processing capacities. It is clear that professional investors (e.g. 
securities analysts, institutional investors, sophisticated individual investors and brokers) have superior capacities than 
lay investors. Even though the risk of information overload may be lower for professional investors, the risk is not 
eliminated. Professional investors are still individuals with limited information-processing capacities, though their 
capacities are superior to those of lay investors. Therefore, the information overload is a significant risk regardless of the 
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capacities. According to this view, in a complex decision-making situation investors aim at 
satisficing instead of optimising, i.e. they search for alternatives that are good enough for 
them.105 Therefore, investors are not able to take into account all disclosed information if 
they become overloaded with information, and actually they may make worse decisions 
than with less information. With a more complicated decision-making processes and a less 
information better decisions might be made than with less complicated decision-making 
processes and more information.106 Thus, issuer and investor interests are not fully 
contradictory in this regard.       
Thirdly, disclosure causes information costs, both to investors and issuers. Information 
costs have been divided into acquisition, processing and verification costs107. Issuers incur 
acquisition and verification costs108 as they produce109 the information in the first place and 
verify it. Investors, on the other hand, incur processing costs as they evaluate distributed 
information. Therefore, disclosure does not come without costs: increasing disclosure is 
efficient only until marginal revenue of a new piece of information is greater than the 
marginal cost of the new piece of information, i.e. the utility of a new piece of information 
exceeds the cost of the new piece. An optimal amount of disclosure would be reached at a 
point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Thus, more information is definitely 
not always better than less. On the contrary, balance between transparency and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
profile of the investors. For a more extensive discussion regarding the subject, see Paredes 2003, 30−36. Further, the 
information overload of professional investors may be even more detrimental to the efficiency since professional 
investors also protect the uninformed investors by offering them a free ride on information: the actions of informed 
traders influence the prices until they are satisfied and the uninformed traders get the same price without any effort of 
learning the information which is the basis for prices. In other words, an influential minority of informed traders, who 
control a critical volume of trading activity, have the power to influence significantly the price formation. Therefore, even 
if there was a lower risk of information overload of professional investors, the overload could have more serious 
consequences on efficiency. See Easterbrook & Fischel 1984, 694; Gilson & Kraakman 1984, 569−572.  
105
 The concept of bounded rationality was first introduced by Simon (1955 & 1957). See also Simon 1972; Paredes 
2003; Barros 2010; Bainbridge 2002, 19−27; Tversky & Kahneman 1974.  
106
 Paredes 2003, 3. However, the suggestion of adopting the concept of bounded rationality and scaling disclosure 
according to it does not necessarily mean abandoning the rational-choice theory completely. The theory (and economics 
in general) aim at explaining, predicting and simplifying tendencies and aggregates and not necessarily the behaviour of 
an individual (Posner 2007, 17). Therefore, the rational-choice theory (and the ECMH) provides a starting point but 
bounded rationality should be considered a limitation when scaling disclosure obligation according to these theories.      
107
 Gilson & Kraakman 1984, 594−595. 
108
 Recipients of the information also incur acquisition and verification costs when they acquire access to the 
information. Disclosure collectivises information production by requiring issuers to distribute verified information which 
eliminates the repetitive acquisition and verification costs for individual investors.   
109
 Producing information should be understood to contain all direct costs from compiling, editing and distributing the 
information, opportunity costs of the time of all who participated in the disclosure process and expenses related to 
disclosure. Easterbrook & Fischel 1984, 707. 
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confidentiality should be determined taken into account the mentioned limits for disclosure 
as indicators of up to what point more disclosure is better than less.    
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3 EU DISCLOSURE REGULATION: FROM MAD TO MAR 
3.1 Current status of disclosure regulation across Member States 
3.1.1 Disclosure regulation pursuant to MAD 
The European Union has had a uniform legal framework to prevent market abuse since 
2003 when the MAD came into force110. The MAD regulates both insider dealing and 
market manipulation which are referred together as market abuse, and it also covers the 
field of disclosure regulation. The high level objective of the MAD is to secure the 
integrity and proper functioning of the financial markets and ensure the investor 
confidence in markets in order to enhance market efficiency, economic growth and wealth 
in general. The MAD also aims at creating a genuine Single Market, reducing the 
fragmentation of the EU securities market regulation and integrating the EU financial 
markets in order to combat the cross-border market failures.111 However, the MAD has, at 
least to a certain degree, failed to achieve the latter target as it has been implemented in 
Member States in various ways112. Therefore, despite the fact that a uniform framework 
exists, there is no uniform EU securities market law and the regulation has remained 
national until so far113.   
The definition of inside information represents a good example of the regulatory 
inconsistences in the implementation of the MAD. A significant change under the MAD 
was adopting a single definition of inside information, compared to the prior directives114 
where the “inside information” relevant for insider trading prohibition was different from 
the “major new developments” to be disclosed115. Pursuant to MAD Article 1(1), ‘inside 
information’ shall mean information of a precise nature which has not been made public, 
relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to one or 
                                                          
110
 The MAD is part of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) of the EU and it represents the first attempt to 
implement the four-level Lamfalussy process discussed in chapter 1.3.2.            
111
 MAD preamble paragraph 1, 2 and 12; Moloney 2008, 27; ESME 2007, 1.   
112
 ESME 2007, 1; Veil & Koch 2012, 6; Di Noia & Gargantini 2012, 488.  
113
 Veil 2013b, 44. 
114
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more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a 
significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related 
derivative financial instruments. Resulting from the mentioned definition, information to 
be classified as inside information needs to be a) precise, b) unpublished and c) have a 
significant price effect116.   
The mentioned definition of inside information has a dual-function and it thus applies both 
to the prohibition of insider dealing117 and to the issuer's obligation to disclose inside 
information, the latter of which is set out in MAD Article 6(1). According to the said 
article Member States shall ensure that issuers of financial instruments inform the public as 
soon as possible of inside information which directly concerns the said issuers. The only 
difference between the inside information to be disclosed and the inside information 
relevant for insider trading prohibition is that the inside information to be disclosed has to 
concern directly the issuer whereas insider trading may also be based on the abuse of 
insider information that concerns the issuer indirectly. The disclosure obligation of MAD 
Article 6(1) is complemented with the delayed disclosure mechanism set out in MAD 
Article 6(2) which enables delaying disclosure in limited circumstances, i.e. when an issuer 
has a legitimate interest to delay disclosure, the delay is not likely to mislead the public 
and the confidentiality of the information can be ensured.   
The adoption of a single definition of inside information has been a significant source of 
inconsistencies in the implementation of the MAD and failures in complying with the 
requirements of the directive118. ESME has even argued that the single definition of inside 
information is the fundamental flaw of the directive119. According to it the definition works 
well in defining the unjustifiable information advantage that a person should not be 
allowed to use in trading. However, problems arise when the same definition is used to 
determine when the issuer's disclosure obligation is triggered, which will inevitably result 
in situations where disclosure obligation is triggered at a stage when the information is too 
premature to be published and when it would be in the interest of the issuer and/or justified 
                                                          
116
 The interpretation of the criteria for inside information has been discussed extensively in the legal literature and the 
subject falls beyond the scope of this thesis. As a summary of the interpretation of the criteria, see e.g. Knuts 2011, 
25−114; Annola 2005, 208−305; Kotiranta 2014, 269−296.   
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 MAD Article  2 − 4 prohibiting the use of inside information, selective disclosure of inside information and advice for 
another person on the basis of inside information.   
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 Di Noia & Gargantini 2009, 14.   
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 ESME 2007, 5.  
25 (72) 
 
by the public interest not to disclose the inside information yet. Surely there is a possibility 
to delay disclosure based on MAD Article 6(2), but it is meant to be applied only in the 
most limited circumstances. While trying to find a solution to this “fundamental flaw”, 
issuers and regulators across Member States have adopted inconsistent approaches to 
disclosing inside information.  
Such inconsistent approaches can be divided into two regulatory models, one-step and two-
step model of inside information120. In a one-step model there is only one definition of 
inside information that triggers both the disclosure obligation and the prohibition of insider 
trading at the same time. As discussed above, the MAD is based on this model. Instead, in 
a two-step model the prohibition of insider trading is triggered first and the disclosure 
obligation later. A two-step model may not necessarily include two different definitions of 
inside information, but the definition is interpreted in a different way in case of insider 
trading prohibition and disclosure obligation. 
If a certain piece of inside information concerns a matter that is initiated, prepared and 
decided within a very short time frame, the one-step and the two-step model do not differ 
significantly on the timing of the disclosure, and the inside information needs to be 
disclosed as soon as possible in both cases. However, this is much of a theoretical situation 
since inside information normally develops through a protracted process, e.g. multi-stage 
negotiation or decision-making process. If disclosure of inside information in a protracted 
process is regulated according to a one-step model, it is essential that disclosure may be 
delayed in certain circumstances. Otherwise, the premature disclosure could endanger the 
ongoing process, e.g. the negotiations of a company acquisition. On the contrary, in a two-
step model a separate mechanism for delaying disclosure is less important as such a 
mechanism is embedded in the model itself.    
The question of how to approach insider trading prohibition and disclosure obligation in a 
protracted process has divided the Member States. A one-step model has been adopted e.g. 
in Germany and France and a two-step e.g. in Finland and other Nordic countries, Italy and 
the UK. The choice between a one-step and a two-step model is of great significance 
regarding the mechanism of delayed disclosure. In a one-step model the possibility of 
delayed disclosure is crucial, because otherwise issuer interests could be at great risk. On 
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the contrary, the mechanism of delayed disclosure is of lesser importance in a two-step 
model which allows by nature the non-disclosure of uncertain information. 
3.1.2 One-step model: Germany and France 
As far as the law on books is concerned, Germany appears to be the most loyal jurisdiction 
to the literal interpretation of the MAD and implementation of a one-step model121. 
However, this is a new direction in Germany as well, since before the implementation of 
the MAD, Germany also relied on a two-step model, had adopted a double definition of 
inside information (Insidertatsache, i.e. inside fact relevant for insider trading and Ad-hoc-
Tatsache, i.e. ad hoc fact relevant for disclosure obligation) and disclosure obligation was 
generally triggered only after a final decision122. Since the implementation of the MAD, the 
scope of disclosure obligation in the German Securities Trading Act123 has extended. The 
use of the possibility to delay disclosure of inside information has also increased 
accordingly124, which supports the presumption that the importance of the delayed 
disclosure mechanism is much greater in a one-step model.  
However, the legal situation in Germany has not been all that clear and the disclosure 
obligation under the MAD has caused uncertainty in Germany, as well. The so far most 
important ECJ preliminary ruling regarding disclosure obligation has been the Daimler 
case125 which was referred to by the German Federal Court of Justice. The most important 
insight of the case was the ECJ's confirmation of the fact that in case of a protracted 
process intended to generate a particular event, an intermediate step of that process which 
is connected to bringing about that future event may constitute inside information and 
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 Such seems to be the case, even though a different wording of inside information has been chosen in implementing 
the directive, see German Securities Trading Act Section 13 (1). See also Veil 2013d, 151−152.     
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 Di Noia & Gargantini 2012, 513. Such an approach was actually quite close to the Nordic reality principle in force, 
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 See German Securities Trading Act Section 13 and 15.    
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therefore trigger the duty to disclosure if there is a realistic prospect126 that the event will 
occur127. The case thus confirmed the trend towards an extending disclosure obligation in 
the EU regulation which, nevertheless, has been criticised in Germany for creating new 
application problems and decreasing legal certainty128.   
In addition to Germany129, France has also adopted a one-step model and implemented the 
MAD almost one-to-one130. However, in addition to implementing the MAD's general rule 
on delayed disclosure, the French regulation also includes a special provision on delaying 
disclosure in case of a material financial transaction if confidentiality is temporarily 
necessary to carry out the transaction and if the confidentiality is ensured131. This special 
provision differs from the MAD provision on delaying disclosure in that it does not require 
legitimate interests132 of the issuer or prohibit misleading the public per se. Therefore, the 
French regulation seems to have wider possibilities of delaying disclosure compared to the 
MAD regulation and also to Germany, since the only criteria for delaying disclosure of a 
material transaction is confidentiality. This brings the French one-step model closer to a 
two-step model than the model adopted in the MAD or in Germany.       
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 With the realistic prospect doctrine ECJ rejected the idea supported by some scholars as well as the advocate-general 
that even a likelihood of occurrence below 50% could suffice, especially if such an occurrence had a strong potential to 
impact market prices. Accordingly, the ECJ rejected the probability/magnitude doctrine (i.e. the idea that only a low 
probability is required of an event or circumstances to constitute inside information if the event or circumstance is likely 
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3.1.3 Two-step model: Nordic countries, Italy and the UK 
Nordic countries (here Finland, Sweden and Denmark), Italy and the UK are examples of 
Member States that have implemented the MAD but, however, have adopted a two-step 
model in their respective legislation133. In the Nordic countries and in Italy, there exists a 
two-step model which includes two different triggering points for insider trading 
prohibition and disclosure obligation. Insider trading prohibition is triggered by inside 
information, as in the MAD, but for disclosure purposes there is another, “unofficial” 
mechanism that allows postponing disclosure of inside information which is embedded in 
the two-step model and which shall thereinafter be called deferred disclosure as a 
difference for delayed disclosure regulated in the MAD134. Deferred disclosure serves the 
same purpose as the delayed disclosure, but it offers more generous opportunities for 
postponing disclosure of inside information. Therefore, in Member States that apply the 
deferred disclosure mechanism there has not been much use for the delayed disclosure 
mechanism. The UK, on the other hand, has quite a unique two-step model in force, which 
will be discussed in detail at the end of this chapter.  
Pursuant to the Finnish Securities Market Act, an issuer shall, without undue delay, 
disclose information about decisions or other facts and circumstances that are likely to 
have a material effect on the value of its securities135. However, an issuer may delay the 
disclosure of inside information for an acceptable reason136. The wording of the first 
provision indicates that the idea of the deferred disclosure has been adopted and the duty to 
disclose is attached to actual decisions, and thus there is no general obligation for an issuer 
to disclose decisions under preparation137. Therefore the provision of delayed disclosure is 
relevant only in cases where a matter has already been decided and should also be 
disclosed without undue delay, but the issuer considers that the criteria for delayed 
disclosure are met138.  
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 Spain is another example of a Member State with a two-step model in force. Di Noia & Gargantini 2012, 510.  
134
 For such a choice of terminology, see also Di Noia & Gargantini 20012, 510.  
135
 Finnish Securities Market Act Chapter 6 Section 4. 
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 Finnish Securities Market Act Chapter 6 Section 5.   
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 Such an interpretation has also been adopted in the Government's Bill (32/2012, 117). 
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 Such an interpretation has been adopted by the Finnish financial supervisory authority (FIVA 7/2013, 19). In reality, 
the provision of delayed disclosure has been applied very rarely in Finland (Knuts & Parkkonen 2014, 148 & 165). 
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Pursuant to the Swedish Securities Market Act, an issuer must make public such 
information regarding its operations and securities which is of significance for the 
assessment of the price of the securities139. The provision is supplemented by the 
regulations of the Swedish financial supervisory authority, according to which an issuer 
must make a disclosure promptly if a decision is made or if an event occurs that, in the 
light of previously disclosed information or otherwise, to a non-negligible extend 
influences the market's perception of the issuer140. Such an interpretation indicates that also 
the Swedish disclosure obligation is linked to an actual decision or an occurred event141 in 
the same way as in Finland, which also restricts the scope of application of the delayed 
disclosure mechanism even if implemented in the Swedish regulation142.     
In Denmark, the wording of the Danish Securities Trading Act corresponds to the 
provisions of the MAD, but the contents of the provision have remained unaltered, i.e. a 
two-step model is still applied in practice143. In the Danish legislation, the information that 
is to be disclosed is attached to the concept of inside information144, but in practice the duty 
to disclose is not triggered before it is clear that the circumstances will exist or the decision 
will be implemented145. Such an interpretation was confirmed by the government's bill, 
according to which information should not be disclosed before a decision has actually been 
made146. The purpose of the delayed disclosure mechanism has been interpreted in a similar 
way as in Finland and it will apply to a situation where a matter has become a reality but 
still needs to be kept unpublished for the sake of the issuer's interest147.     
As the examples indicate, Nordic countries have adopted an approach where disclosure 
obligation is linked to an actual decision or occurred event and the duty to disclose is 
triggered later than in the one-step model. Academic discussion regarding the one-step and 
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the two-step model of inside information has been especially active among certain scholars 
in Denmark148. In the Danish legal literature it has been pointed out that the two-step model 
adopted in the Nordic law is based on a reality principle which means that the duty to 
disclose is triggered when an event that meets the criteria for inside information becomes a 
reality. This could be the case even before the formalization of such an event, and therefore 
the principle has also been called the principle of reality rather than formality.149 The 
reality principle had been established in the Nordic law already before the MAD and it has 
remained in force after the implementation of the MAD, as well.  
Such an approach has been justified with two arguments in the Nordic countries. Firstly, 
the Nordic implementation has not been considered to collide with the MAD but to 
actually correspond to it150, which clearly shows that the provisions of the MAD have been 
unclear and open to various interpretations within each national regulation. Secondly, the 
Nordic implementation has actually been argued151 to be supported by the wording of the 
implementation directive152 Article 2(2) pursuant to which the disclosure obligation of 
MAD Article 6(1) will be triggered upon the coming into existence of a set of 
circumstances or the occurrence of an event, albeit not yet formalised [emphasis added]. 
Based on this Article it seems justified to argue that the definition of inside information is 
more restricted in case of disclosure obligation than in case of insider trading.  
The Nordic restrictive interpretation of the definition of inside information relevant for 
disclosure obligation differs from the definition of inside information relevant for insider 
trading in that only two of the criteria of inside information apply: the information needs to 
be unpublished and have a significant price effect. However, the precision criterion has 
been interpreted restrictively or actually it has been replaced by the reality principle which 
raises the threshold for duty to disclose. The precision criterion of inside information is the 
one defining the timing of the disclosure of information which meets the other criteria of 
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inside information, and therefore, a two-step model of inside information has developed as 
a consequence of a more restricted interpretation of the precision criterion compared to a 
one-step model.  
To be more precise, the Nordic disclosure obligation has not, in fact, even been attached to 
the concept of inside information but to one of its criteria, significant price effect. 
According to the Finnish and Swedish law, disclosure obligation is attached to “decisions 
or other facts and circumstances that are likely to have a material effect on the value of its 
securities” and to “information which is of significance for the assessment of the price of 
the securities”, respectively [emphasis added]153. On the contrary, the definition of inside 
information has been adopted in the Danish law, but the legal practice, however, 
corresponds to the Finnish and Swedish one. Such practice has also been explicitly stated 
in the stock exchange rules of each Nordic country which have an important practical 
relevance. Virtually the same wording has been adopted in the issuer rules of each country, 
according to which an issuer shall, as soon as possible, disclose information about 
decisions or other facts and circumstances that are price-sensitive [emphasis added]154.  
Besides the Nordic countries, Italy is a frequently used example155 of a Member State 
having adopted a two-step model of inside information156, and it has also justified its choice 
based on the implementation directive Article 2(2) in the same way as in the Danish 
literature. Despite the fact that Italy has implemented the one-step model of the MAD, 
disclosure is mandated only when the final outcome of a process has been reached157, and 
this has also been explicitly confirmed by the Italian financial supervisory authority 
Consob. According to Consob, information on future events may constitute inside 
information triggering the prohibition on insider dealing but not leading to the duty to 
disclose158. Further, in 2010, Consob decided to fine an issuer of disclosing incomplete 
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 Thus, the wording of the disclosure provisions only contains the significant price effect criterion. The other two (the 
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information regarding pending antitrust proceedings which were not yet completed, and no 
significant event had therefore occurred159. Consob has also explicitly stated that when it 
comes to the disclosure obligation, the definition of inside information needs to be 
interpreted narrowly and therefore duty to disclosure arises if and only if the relevant event 
or set of circumstances has already occurred (but not necessary formalised)160.161 Such a 
view corresponds virtually to the Nordic reality principle.    
The UK, on the other hand, has adopted quite a unique form of a two-step model and it 
differs significantly form the Nordic and Italian models. The UK has adopted a two-step 
model after implementing the MAD and it has two different triggering points for insider 
trading prohibition and disclosure obligation as the Nordic countries. However, the UK has 
not just adopted two different interpretations for the definition of inside information but it 
also has another concept in addition to the concept of inside information. The UK model 
includes the RINGA concept (which stands for relevant information not generally 
available), which had been adopted already before the MAD, in addition to the definition 
of inside information. The decision to retain the RINGA provision also after implementing 
the MAD can be considered gold plating.162   
In the UK, the concept of inside information adopted in the MAD sets the criteria for the 
information that needs to be disclosed, and the concept of RINGA sets the criteria for the 
information that is not allowed to be used on trading. To be more precise, RINGA is 
information which is not generally available in the market, but which would be regarded (if 
it was available) as relevant when deciding the terms of a transaction, provided that a 
reasonable regular market user would regard the behaviour concerned to be 
unacceptable163. Consequently, the RINGA concept is broader than the concept of inside 
information and it extends the scope of inside information in the context of insider 
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trading.164 The importance of the RINGA concept has been justified by the fact that 
information can be abused in trading before it is precise or certain enough to be disclosed. 
Such an approach was seen important in the UK especially by investors, who feared that 
the omission of the RINGA provision would allow people to trade to the disadvantage of 
others on the basis of information not generally available to everyone165.    
As indicated above, there is also another important difference between the Nordic and 
Italian two-step model and the UK two-step model: whereas the Nordic and Italian model 
restricts the definition of inside information adopted in the MAD for disclosure purposes, 
the UK model extends the definition of inside information166 for insider trading purposes. 
Both approaches end up in a model where there are two different triggering points for 
insider trading prohibition and disclosure obligation, but the rationales differ. The Nordic 
countries and Italy appear to have ended up in a two-step model to protect issuer interests, 
i.e. to avoid a situation where an issuer would be obliged to disclose information which is 
too premature. On the other hand, the UK appears to have ended up in a two-step model to 
protect investor interests, i.e. to avoid raising the threshold for trading regarded as insider 
trading too high.          
3.1.4 Comparison of the models 
As it has been discussed, the implementation of the MAD across Member States is 
inconsistent and there is no common understanding of the definition of insider information. 
Two definite regulatory models stand out and the Member States rely basically on either a 
one-step and or a two-step model of inside information. However, some Members States 
even seem to be applying both models at the same time. An example of this is France: it 
has clearly implemented a one-step model, but it has, however, included a special 
provision regarding the delayed disclosure which gives more latitude for an issuer than the 
MAR at least as far as the law in books is concerned. Actually, the French provision 
appears to be quite close to the deferred disclosure mechanism adopted in the Nordic 
countries. This places the French model a bit closer to a two-step model than the German 
model.  
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To conclude, the various implementation measures across Member States indicate that the 
MAD has clearly been considered too strict on its disclosure regulation since almost all 
studied Member States have enacted some alleviation in the implementation of the MAD. 
If a spectrum of the studied Member States is outlined, the two-step model of the Nordic 
countries and Italy will be at the other end of the spectrum with the most permissive 
disclosure regulation that clearly prioritises issuer interests more than the other Member 
States. The one-step model of France and Germany167 will be placed on the spectrum next, 
France having, however, a bit more generous regulation, as discussed in the previous 
paragraph. Finally, the two-step model of the UK168 is at the other end of the spectrum. The 
UK indeed has a two-step model in place but it has adopted a broader definition of inside 
information for insider trading, which actually tightens the regulation compared to the 
MAD and other Member States. The UK has clearly prioritised investor protection at the 
expense of issuer interests. The following table illustrates the regulatory differences in the 
chosen Member States.  
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 However, it should be noted that the German interpretation of the criteria for delayed disclosure has been quite 
expansive which significantly alleviates the prima facie strictness of the German regulation. Interpretation of the delayed 
disclosure criteria will be discussed thoroughly in chapter 4.1. 
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 Nordic 
countries 
Italy France Germany The UK 
Regulatory 
model 
Two-step Two-step One-step One-step Two-step 
Definition of 
inside 
information 
Narrow for 
disclosure 
Narrow for 
disclosure 
One-to-one One-to-one169 Broad for 
insider trading 
Deferred 
disclosure 
Yes Yes 
 
No No No 
Delayed 
disclosure170 
One-to-one, no 
practical 
relevance 
One-to-one, no 
practical 
relevance 
One-to-one, but 
also a special 
provision added 
One-to-one, the 
criteria for 
delay has been 
extended 
One-to-one, the 
criteria for 
delay has been 
extended 
Informing 
authorities 
on the 
delay171 
Required 
(except 
Denmark) 
Required Not required Not required Not required 
 
 
Chart 1. Definition of inside information and disclosure of inside information in certain Member States. 
 
What could then be the reason behind the mentioned regulatory choices and the different 
emphasis on either issuer or investor interests? An explanation may lie in the structure of 
corporate ownership and corporate governance, because of which it has been argued that 
the optimal amount of disclosure varies across countries172. The UK companies have the 
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interpretation of the criteria for delayed disclosure will be discussed in detail in chapter 4, which shows that there are 
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most dispersed share ownership of the studied Member States which has led to investor-
oriented regulation much in a same way as is the case in the US173. On the other hand, the 
continental European companies have traditionally had a concentrated share ownership 
structure with a controlling shareholder (e.g. family in Italy, another firm in Germany and 
a state in France)174 and the same applies to the companies in the Nordic countries, which 
also typically have a dominant shareholder175 (e.g. an institutional investor or state). 
Dominant shareholders are often in a powerful position and therefore do not need similar 
protection as the shareholders of companies with dispersed ownership.  
However, the said does not explain the difference between Germany176 (and France) and 
the other studied Member States. The difference could, on the other hand, be explained by 
the fact that German corporate governance system has been described to be very 
stakeholder oriented (e.g. shareholders, employees and the society in general) in a similar 
way as the British system is shareholder oriented177. In a shareholder and stakeholder 
oriented model the management of a company is not responsible to any particular 
shareholder or stakeholder but to all of them. The dispersed stakeholder structure may 
require similar emphasis on the stakeholder protection as the dispersed shareholder 
structure requires on investor protection. Such a rational could explain the differences of 
the regulation between Germany and especially the Nordic countries, where the disclosure 
regulation has been quite issuer-centric. The dominant shareholders of the Nordic 
companies have typically been selectively informed before the public disclosure of 
significant matters178, and the investor protection has been considered less important. The 
“active ownership” of investors typical in Nordic countries has resulted in giving investors 
access to boards and allowing selective disclosure to them in confidence179, which may 
explain disclosure regulation with a lower emphasis on investor interests in general as the 
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dominant shareholder's need for information has been satisfied also without public 
disclosure (i.e. via selective disclosure).             
3.2 Disclosure regulation pursuant to MAR  
In the future the Market Abuse Regulation180 will be the main instrument for combatting 
market abuse. The regulation was given on 12th June 2014 and, unlike the MAD, the MAR 
will be directly applicable law in the Member States starting from July 2016. The objective 
of the MAR is unchanged compared to the MAD: the goal is still to create a genuine 
internal market and ensure the market integrity and investor confidence in order to enhance 
market efficiency181. The main reasons for reviewing the MAD were gaps in regulation, 
problems in enforcing the MAD, administrative burdens on issuers, especially SMEs, and 
lack of clarity and legal certainty182. The latter was related e.g. to the disclosure of inside 
information. Under the MAR the goal is the true harmonization of the EU securities market 
regulation instead of minimum harmonization which has been the actual level of 
harmonization in the era of the MAD183. The general trend of disclosure regulation in the 
Member States has been towards a broader disclosure obligation and increasing public 
disclosure184. The trend already started from enacting the MAD and has continued through 
the preliminary ruling of ECJ in the Daimler case, and the regulation will continue to 
tighten under the MAR. By extending the scope of inside information, the focus of the 
disclosure regime is shifting to the possibilities of delaying disclosure185.   
The most striking difference between the MAD and the MAR is the fact that the MAR has 
been enacted as a regulation and it will have a direct effect in the Member States186. The 
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decision to transform the MAD into a regulation was based on the fact that the regulatory 
framework within financial markets was lacking cohesion because of the options and 
discretions offered to the Member States in the transposition and implementation of the 
directive. In the legislative drafts of the MAR it has been argued that a regulation will 
avoid transposition leading to diverging national rules that are interpreted according to 
diverging cultures and it will best promote the harmonization and functioning of a single 
market. While a directive and its implementation leave space for national interpretation, a 
direct applicability of the MAR should offer greater legal certainty and greater emphasis 
on a pan-European interpretation.187 After the entry into force of the MAR, only the EU 
doctrine of interpretation should be applied instead of national methods of interpretation188.  
It is true that the options and discretions of the MAD seem to have been an important 
source of inconsistencies, but such an explanation does not apply to the diverging 
implementation of the definition of inside information or the disclosure provisions of the 
MAD, which included hardly any189 options or discretions regarding the national 
implementation. Thus, the application practices in Member States have been diverging 
mainly because of the lack of clear definitions of the key concepts which are still 
undefined unless EU institutions (Commission, ESMA and ECJ) draw clear lines in the 
future190. 
The MAR follows the regulatory path of the MAD and also codifies the ECJ's preliminary 
ruling on the Daimler case. Firstly, the definition of inside information will remain 
unchanged as MAR Article 7(1a) corresponds to MAD Article 1(1), and MAR Article 7(2) 
and 7(4) correspond to the implementation directive191 Article 1(1) and 1(2), which have 
now been incorporated into the MAR. However, MAR Article 7(3) is new and it codifies 
the practice adopted by ECJ in the Daimler case and enacts that an intermediate step in a 
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protracted process shall be deemed to be inside information if, by itself, it satisfies the 
criteria of inside information. The preamble paragraph 16 of the MAR also confirms the 
realistic prospect doctrine and rejects the probability/magnitude doctrine consistently with 
the Daimler case. Secondly, disclosure obligation remains also the same as the first 
paragraph of MAR Article 17(1) corresponds to the first paragraph of MAD 6(1). Thirdly, 
issuer's right to delay the disclosure of inside information is allowed in the MAR Article 
17(4) under the same criteria as in MAD Article 6(2). However, in the MAR the right to 
delay has also been extended to cover a delay of disclosure in a protracted process 
consistently with the amendment to the definition of inside information.  
The most notable change in the disclosure regulation is the provision of MAR Article 17(4) 
according to which an issuer shall inform the competent authority of the delay in disclosure 
and provide, if a Member State so requires, a written explanation of how the conditions for 
the delay were met, immediately after the information is disclosed to the public. In the 
MAD, Member States were allowed to decide on whether to require an issuer to inform the 
competent authority of the decision to delay disclosure192, but under the MAR this 
informing is mandatory.    
An important consequence resulting from the fact that the MAR has been enacted in a form 
of a regulation is that the one-step approach adopted already in the MAD will in the future 
be directly applicable in all Member States. This means that the Member States having 
previously applied a two-step model should change their legal practices accordingly.193 The 
adoption of a one-step model in the MAR was not obvious since a two-step model was first 
suggested in the draft MAR194. However, the Commission gave up on the idea of a new 
category of inside information that should trigger insider trading prohibition but not the 
duty to disclose, which had been supported e.g. by the ESME Report195. The preliminary 
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ruling of ECJ in the Daimler case was also in favour of such a choice. Consequently, a 
one-step model consistent with the MAD was adopted also in the MAR.    
Resulting from the adoption of a one-step model, the scope of inside information will 
extend at least in those Member States that previously applied a two-step model. From the 
point of view of those Member States that have applied a one-step model already before, 
the disclosure regulation of the MAR does not introduce significant changes but only 
confirms the current legal practice. All in all, the general trend towards a broader 
disclosure obligation shifts the focus of the disclosure regime to the possibilities of 
delaying disclosure across Member States, and the delayed disclosure mechanism will have 
an increasingly important role in protecting issuer interests in the future.           
To conclude, the most “revolutionary” element of the disclosure regulation of the MAR is 
the fact that it has been enacted as a regulation and the provisions are to be directly 
applicable in the Member States and that it is supposed to deepen the harmonization of the 
EU securities market regulation. However, if the EU institutions fail to elaborate on the 
disclosure requirements and main concepts, especially the definition of inside information 
and the criteria for delaying disclosure of inside information, which are open to various 
interpretations, this leaves substantial discretion to the Member States and enables 
inconsistences in the future as well. The national practices differ significantly, result from 
specific characteristics of each Member State and might thus be surprisingly deep-rooted. 
Therefore, new regulation alone does not result in harmonised practices but the national 
interpretation needs clear guidance in order to obtain a consistent interpretation practices 
across Member States.    
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4 DELAYED DISCLOSURE 
4.1 Criteria for delaying disclosure 
To tackle the problems arising from the adoption of a single definition of inside 
information, the delayed disclosure mechanism provides a possible solution196 if the 
provision is interpreted in a way that actually is of value for issuers197. As it has been said, 
the focus of the disclosure regime is shifting to delaying disclosure, since the disclosure 
obligation has reached the summit and requires correction198 not to jeopardise issuer 
interests. This correction is enacted in the MAR, as well as in the MAD, in a form of 
delayed disclosure mechanism. However, the delayed disclosure mechanism is by 
definition an exemption provision and it should be applied only in exceptional 
circumstances199.  
Following the regulatory path of the MAD, MAR Article 17(4) states that an issuer may, 
on its own responsibility, delay disclosure to the public of inside information provided that 
(a) immediate disclosure is likely to prejudice the legitimate interests of the issuer, (b) 
delay of disclosure is not likely to mislead the public and (c) the issuer is able to ensure the 
confidentiality of that information. All of the mentioned conditions need to be met at the 
same time. Disclosure of inside information related to an intermediate step of a protracted 
process may be delayed under the same criteria. Further, an issuer shall inform the 
competent authority that disclosure of the information was delayed, immediately after the 
information is disclosed to the public. The MAR does not define any specific time limit for 
delaying disclosure and it has been argued in the legal literature that the delay may 
continue as long as the criteria are met200. An issuer is responsible for evaluating whether 
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the criteria are met and for the decision to delay201, which is made even clearer by the MAR 
which requires an issuer to inform the authority about the delay only after the disclosure of 
the delayed information.       
Under the MAD, the implementation of the delayed disclosure provision has varied across 
Member States202, as the following chapters will indicate. The discussion has been intense 
especially in Member States having adopted a one-step model of inside information. On 
the other hand, in Member States applying a two-step model the delayed disclosure 
mechanism has not evoked discussion to the same degree, because the question of whether 
the delay should be allowed only rarely arises. However, the interpretation of the criteria 
for delaying disclosure will become a crucial question in all Member States in the future as 
the MAR comes into effect.  
4.1.1 Legitimate interests of the issuer 
MAR preamble paragraph 50 aims at clarifying the first criterion of MAR Article 17(4) 
and the concept of legitimate interests of the issuer. According to it legitimate interests 
may, in particular, relate to ongoing negotiations or management body decisions which 
need the approval of another body. These two situations are just examples and the list is 
not exhaustive. In 2007, CESR gave its guidance203 on interpreting the criteria of legitimate 
interest of the issuer set out in MAD Article 6(2). The wording of the provision has 
remained substantially the same in MAR Article 17(4) and its recitals, and therefore the 
former CESR guidance is still relevant, at least until ESMA gives further guidance on the 
subject. According to CESR, the right to delay disclosure is a derogation from the general 
rule rather than a norm and therefore CESR refrains from extending the list of situations 
and provides only illustrative examples of the two mentioned situations. CESR further 
emphasises that the decision of delayed disclosure remains the responsibility of an issuer 
who needs to evaluate the specific circumstances of a certain situation204.  
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The first situation to which legitimate interests may relate is set out in MAR preamble 
paragraph 50 and it regards ongoing negotiations which can be divided into two categories: 
a) ongoing negotiation related to the normal course of business where the outcome or 
normal pattern of those negotiations would be likely to be affected by disclosure (referred 
hereinafter as ordinary negotiations) and b) ongoing negotiation related to ensuring the 
long-term financial recovery of the issuer (as long as the issuer is not insolvent) where 
disclosure would seriously jeopardise the interest of existing and potential shareholders 
(referred hereinafter as financial recovery negotiations). Ordinary negotiations are the 
general form of negotiations and financial recovery negotiations refer to a specific form of 
ongoing negotiations.  
According to CESR the ongoing negotiations subject to a right to delay disclosure may 
concern e.g. confidentiality constraints related to a competitive situation, product 
development, patents, inventions, sales of major holdings or other impending 
developments which could be jeopardised by premature disclosure205.  These examples give 
an idea of what sort of ordinary negotiations may form a legitimate reason for delaying 
disclosure. Otherwise the wording regarding ordinary negotiations is actually quite broad, 
since the only requirement is that the outcome or normal pattern of those negotiations 
would be likely to be affected by public disclosure. Therefore, the mere possibility of an 
effect on the normal course of negotiations should be regarded as a legitimate reason for 
delaying disclosure.  
When it comes to financial recovery negotiations, the requirements are stricter. It is 
required that the disclosure would seriously jeopardise the interest of existing and potential 
shareholders. Thus a mere possibility of an effect is not enough but, on the contrary, the 
effect should be serious. Such a stricter wording is reasonable since delaying disclosure of 
information regarding financial recovery negotiations has a significant potential to conflict 
with the MAR's aim of investor protection. Information regarding the viability of an issuer 
is one of the most important areas of investor information because in case of a serious 
threat to the viability, the value of an investment may be endangered in its entirety206.  
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Paragraph 50 also indicates that financial recovery negotiations are a legitimate reason for 
delay only if the difficulties do not amount to insolvency of the issuer. It is clear that 
allowing delayed disclosure of the risk of insolvency would place the investors' 
investments in great danger which would not be acceptable taking into consideration the 
purpose of the regulation, i.e. investor protection. Consequently, it has been argued in the 
Finnish legal literature that the legitimate interest in financial recovery negotiations should 
be interpreted restrictively and it should be connected only with particular negotiations 
carried out to ensure the viability of an issuer, and the interpretation of legitimate interest 
should not be extended to cover information regarding the viability of an issuer in 
general207. A similar approach has been adopted in France, where a court allowed delaying 
disclosure of information regarding the details of restructuring agreement but required, at 
the same time, disclosure of the fact that the company's financial situation had been 
deteriorated considerably208.                         
The second situation to which legitimate interests may relate is set out in paragraph 50 and 
it regards decisions taken or contracts made by the management body of an issuer which 
need an approval of another body of the issuer in order to become effective. This provision 
applies to situations where an issuer has a hierarchical decision-making structure and 
public disclosure of the information before final approval, together with the simultaneous 
announcement that the approval remains pending, would jeopardise the correct assessment 
of the information by the public. This is a good example of a situation, where securities 
markets law and company law collide. Member States have very different corporate 
governance structures on which the importance of this exemption depends. For example 
Germany209 has a two-tier-system of organising the management of a listed company with a 
separate management and a supervisory board, whereas the UK210 has a one-tier-system 
with only a board of directors with both a management and supervisory role. The Nordic211 
corporate governance system, on the other hand, lies somewhere in between. The Nordic 
model may be described as a dual executive system with a board of directors and a board of 
                                                          
207
 Knuts & Parkkonen 2014, 167; Häyrynen & Kajala, 2013, 193. Similar interpretation has also been adopted in the 
UK, see FCA 2014, DTR 2.5.4. 
208
 Case Metaleurop SA, see Couret et al. 2012, 1065−1066.  
209
 For the German corporate governance system, see Lau Hansen 2003, 59−68 and Lau Hansen 2008, 45−46.  
210
 For the UK corporate governance system, see Lau Hansen 2003, 68−72 and Lau Hansen 2008, 45−46. 
211
 For the Nordic corporate governance system, see Lau Hansen 2003, 72−80 and Lau Hansen 2008, 47−49. 
 
45 (72) 
 
management (which may be a collective body or one person, i.e. the CEO), the latter of 
which being subject to the directions of the board of directors. Therefore, it is crucial to 
allow delayed disclosure for companies with a hierarchical system (i.e. the two-tier-system 
or the dual executive system) in case where the decision is subject to the approval of 
another body. Otherwise autonomy of the superior body would be endangered and the rules 
of national company regulation would be overridden.212    
However, decisions which need the approval of another body as the legitimate reason for 
delaying disclosure also include a risk of abusing the exemption. As it was discussed in 
chapter 3.1.3, the reality principle has been adopted in the Nordic disclosure regulation, 
and according to this principle, an event can be regarded as reality even before the 
formalization of such an event, and therefore the principle has also been called the 
principle of reality rather than formality. Consequently, to avoid abusing the right to delay, 
the interpretation of this exemption should be restricted, and this exemption should not be 
applied in cases where the decision of another board is clear or only a formality. The 
exemption is only meant for situations where the discretion of the superior body needs 
protection.      
Member States have adopted different approaches on interpreting the legitimate interest 
criterion. However, common to the different approaches is that all studied Member States 
have strived for expanding its interpretation, which again indicates the strictness of the EU 
disclosure regulation. Others have added relevant situations to the list of paragraph 50 and 
others have pursued a dogmatic approach on what constitutes a legitimate interest213. As it 
was discussed in chapter 3.1.3, the UK has emphasised the investor protection over issuer 
interests214, which also shows in the fact that the UK financial supervisory authority FCA 
has adopted a restricted interpretation of the right to delay disclosure. According to FCA it 
is unlikely that there are other situations215 where a delay would be acceptable, besides 
ongoing negotiations or decisions which need the approval of another body, the latter of 
which being, however, of low importance in the UK where a one-tier-system in 
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management prevails216. However, FCA has added one specific situation in the regulation, 
according to which an issuer should not be obliged to disclose impending developments 
that could be jeopardised by premature disclosure217. Thus, such impending development 
should be considered as a legitimate interest for delay. 
As it was discussed in chapter 3.1.2, the French regulation includes a specific provision on 
delaying disclosure in case of a material financial transaction if confidentiality is 
temporarily necessary to carry out the transaction and if the confidentiality is ensured218. 
This special provision differs remarkably from the MAD provision on delaying disclosure 
in that it does not require legitimate interests of the issuer or prohibit misleading public. 
The provision thus provides more extensive possibilities for delay than the MAD and is 
therefore closer to the deferred disclosure mechanism than delayed disclosure mechanism.   
Regardless of the fact that the delayed disclosure mechanism has rarely been used in 
Finland, there exists some further argumentation regarding the legitimate interest criterion. 
First of all, it has been clearly stated that even price-relevant information may be regarded 
as legitimate interest and be delayed if disclosing such information separately from other 
premature information would mislead investors219.  Also, it has been argued that disclosure 
of only a part of the information may be delayed if the criteria for delayed disclosure are 
met220. This could be the case regarding e.g. the price or other conditions of a corporate 
acquisition221. Such a view is consistent with what was said regarding the financial 
recovery negotiations and the fact that an issuer may not refrain from disclosing the 
considerable deterioration of the company's financial situation, but it may however delay 
the disclosure of the details of the restructuring negotiations.     
In Germany, on the other hand, a dogmatic approach to the legitimate interest has been 
pursued222. The German legislation has clearly extended the concept of legitimate interest 
by stating that a legitimate interest may exist if issuer interests in keeping the information 
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secret outweighs the interest of the capital market in complete and prompt publication223. In 
practice, the delay is allowed for any interest of certain relevance if disclosure of the 
information could be detrimental to the issuer, and a mere possibility of an effect on the 
interest is sufficient224. BaFin has specified that only the interest of the issuer shall be taken 
into consideration and not the interest of a third party, e.g. another negotiation party. BaFin 
has also interpreted the legitimate interest criterion in an expansive way and has not 
adhered to the examples of the EU regulation225. It has stated on its issuer guidelines that 
the so far adopted restrictive interpretation of the possibilities to delay disclosure may no 
longer be sustained in the future since the definition of inside information has broadened to 
also cover intermediate steps of a protracted process and the interpretation needs to be 
adjusted accordingly226.   
4.1.2 Misleading the public 
If an issuer has a legitimate interest to delay disclosure of inside information, it must be 
evaluated whether the delay is likely to mislead the public. The MAR does not give any 
further advice on how to interpret this criterion which has been strongly criticised in the 
legal literature, as the definition of inside information regards information that a reasonable 
investor would use as a basis for decision-making, and so any delay in disclosure would be 
misleading by definition227. The provision may be regarded to have a fundamental flaw and 
it has even been suggested to delete this criterion all together228. However, the deletion of 
this criterion was not supported by the Commission229 or CESR230 who stated that such 
argumentation cannot be supported as it would mean that the criterion could never be met 
and the provision would have no practical relevance whatsoever.     
To clarify the criterion, it has been suggested that a delay should be considered to be likely 
to mislead public only if the information runs counter to the market consensus i.e. only 
when the investment community clearly shows, through market prices, analyst coverage or 
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others, expectations that are contradicted by the information231. Thus, this approach 
suggests that, in case of inside information contradictory to the market consensus, the 
delay would not be acceptable at all. In Germany, on the contrary, it has been stated that it 
is inevitable that informational asymmetry exists always when disclosure of inside 
information has been delayed, and thus the asymmetry should not be regarded as 
misleading per se, but during the delay, the issuer may not provide any indications which 
are contradictory to the undisclosed inside information. A "no comment policy" would be 
acceptable in such a situation.232   
This criterion is, in practice, the strictest of all the criteria of delayed disclosure233. 
Therefore, the interpretation of this criterion has an important impact on the applicability 
of the provision. Should this criterion be interpreted restrictively, it would mean narrowing 
the applicability of the entire exemption. As a solution, it has been suggested in the Finnish 
legal literature that the above discussed legitimate interests should constitute the main 
criterion for delay and the other two should be supplementary criteria taking into 
consideration the investor protection also in case of a delay. According to this view, the 
interest of an issuer must be weighted up against the interests of the public in assessing 
whether the criteria are met, and this assessment also defines how much weight must be 
given to the misleading criterion. Thus, the Finnish legal literature suggests that the 
misleading criterion may be superseded if the interests protected by the delay exceed the 
importance of prompt disclosure.234 
The interpretation proposed in the Finnish legal literature seems reasonable as it supports 
the expansive interpretation and protecting issuer interests, which in the first place is the 
purpose of the provision, but it also takes into consideration investor protection. The 
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approach suggesting that the delay should not be acceptable in case of inside information 
contradictory to the market consensus is too categorical and it endangers the interests of 
the issuer. However, it could be required that in case of inside information contradictory to 
the market consensus, the market should be “warned” about the impending developments 
or events (e.g. that certain negotiations are ongoing) for the sake of not misleading the 
public, but the publication of details of the situation (e.g. details of the ongoing 
negotiations) could be delayed. Such an approach has been adopted in France, where a 
distinction has been made between “general information” (information générale) and 
“particular information” (information particulière, e.g. particular facts and agreements). 
The first needs to be published in any case and the latter, even though it is information that 
could certainly affect the investor decision-making, may be kept unpublished as the public 
can be considered to be sufficiently informed by the publication of the general information 
already indicating the main consequences of the particular information. Therefore, the 
public cannot be considered to be truly misled235. Further, it is reasonable to require that the 
issuer may not provide any indications which are contradictory to the undisclosed inside 
information. When it comes to the definition of public, the misleading criteria should be 
assessed from the point of view of a reasonable investor236, which would be in line with 
assessment of the criteria of inside information.   
The wording of delayed disclosure provision of the MAR presumes that the delay of 
disclosure may only mislead public, but it does not recognise the possibility that the 
disclosure itself may also mislead the public if a piece of information is separated from its 
context and published prematurely. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the Finnish 
interpretation has supported the idea that even price-relevant information may be delayed if 
disclosing such information separately from other information too premature for disclosing 
would mislead investors. Therefore, the misleading criteria should also include situations 
where a premature disclosure would actually mislead the public. The legitimate interest 
criterion would be met in such a situation, as it was discussed in the previous chapter, and 
the delay should be acceptable if the confidentiality criterion is also met.  
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4.1.3 Confidentiality of the information 
When an issuer decides to delay the disclosure of inside information based on the fact that 
it has a legitimate interest to delay disclosure and the delay is not likely to mislead the 
public, it must ensure the confidentiality of the information. MAR Article 17(7) states that 
if confidentiality of the inside information is no longer ensured, the issuer shall disclose 
that inside information to the public as soon as possible. The mentioned article also applies 
to a situation where a rumour explicitly relates to inside information the disclosure of 
which has been delayed and that rumour is sufficiently accurate to indicate that the 
confidentiality of that information is no longer ensured. Thus, when the inside information 
the disclosure of which has been delayed can either no longer be kept confidential or the 
information has leaked, it must be disclosed.  
The MAR does not contain any details on which obligations result for an issuer from the 
criteria of confidentiality. Indication can be searched from the implementation directive of 
the MAD which further illustrates Article 3(2) on how the issuer is expected to control the 
access to unpublished inside information. Firstly, the issuer shall have established effective 
arrangements to deny access to such information to persons other than those who require it 
for the exercise of their functions within the issuer. Secondly, the issuer shall take the 
necessary measures to ensure that any person with access to such information 
acknowledges the legal and regulatory duties entailed and is aware of the sanctions 
attached to the misuse or improper circulation of such information. Thirdly, the issuer shall 
have in place measures which allow immediate public disclosure in case the issuer was not 
able to ensure the confidentiality of the relevant inside information. According to the 
Finnish approach, an issuer may maintain such readiness by drafting a disclosure plan in 
case of a loss of confidentiality237. Further, an issuer is also obliged to draw the list of 
insiders who have access to inside information. Besides insider lists, the MAR does not 
require any organised compliance structures or documentation of the measures taken to 
preserve the confidentiality, but such measures may, however, be recommendable238.    
Rumours have resulted in difficulties in interpretation. For example in Germany and in 
Finland it has been stated that if rumours are being spread regarding the delayed inside 
information, an issuer may however continue to delay the disclosure of inside information, 
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if it is certain that the rumours are not result of a leak239. This interpretation is reasonable 
since an issuer does not have an obligation to comment on rumours240. However, not all 
Member States have adopted the same interpretation, and e.g. in Spain the disclosure 
would be required in such a situation241.     
4.2 Procedure for delay  
The provision regarding the delayed disclosure mechanism includes three criteria which 
have been discussed above. However, the provision also includes another criterion which 
regards the actual procedures of a delay, and these procedures will be discussed here only 
shortly. According to the MAD, Member States were allowed to decide on whether to 
require an issuer to inform the competent authority of the decision to delay disclosure, but 
under the MAR this informing is mandatory. MAR Article 17(4) requires an issuer to 
inform the competent authority of the delay in disclosure and provide, if a Member State so 
requires, a written explanation of how the conditions for the delay were met, immediately 
after the information is disclosed to the public.  
Along with such a provision and especially in a Member State which decides to require a 
written explanation, the documentation of the decision-making procedures and of the 
evaluation on how the conditions for the delay were met will be crucial, even though such 
documentation is not required explicitly. In particular, it has been discussed whether an 
issuer is required to make an actual decision regarding the delay or whether it is sufficient 
that the criteria for delay are met242. According to the German view it has been quite clear 
that disclosure must be delayed actively and a conscious resolution of the management is 
required243. In addition, a question has been raised on whether a precautionary delay is 
accepted in a situation where an issuer is not certain of whether the information amounts to 
inside information244. As the definition of inside information is open to various 
interpretations it should be acceptable to use the delayed disclosure mechanism also in case 
there is no certainty of the character of the information.  
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It is clear that as the importance of the delayed disclosure increases after the MAR coming 
into force, the burden of authorities and the bureaucracy regarding the delay will increase. 
On the other hand, the MAR should enable more efficient ways for authorities to supervise 
delayed disclosure, as the “informal” practices of delaying disclosure (e.g. deferred 
disclosure) should become eliminated and all cases of delayed disclosure should, at least in 
theory, come to the authorities' knowledge. This also means more efficient ways for 
supervising insider trading, as the authorities will be better informed on where to look for 
the possible abuse of inside information.245  
4.3 Sanctions 
Sanctioning breaches of disclosure regulation is mainly a matter of national law, especially 
when it comes to criminal sanctions. The MAD includes only light provisions regarding 
sanctions246 and Member States have yet again adopted a wide variety of approaches to 
enforcement. Sanctions vary from civil liability and administrative sanctions to criminal 
sanctions247. Consequently, the inefficiency of the MAD sanctioning regulation has been an 
important concern and the MAR is about to introduce some significant changes to the 
regulation to prevent the regulatory arbitrage248. 
Compared to the MAD, the MAR regulates administrative measures and sanctions much 
more extensively in its Chapter 5. Criminal sanctions for market abuse are regulated in a 
complementary sanctions directive249, the first directive adopted under TFEU250 Article 
83(2) which enables enacting minimum rules on criminal law at the EU level251. According 
to the directive, the Member States are required to provide criminal sanctions for at least 
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serious cases of insider dealing, market manipulation and unlawful disclosure of inside 
information. On the other hand, breaches of disclosure obligation are not required to be 
sanctioned under the criminal law252 but a Member State may adopt such sanctions in a 
national regulation253. If such a national regulation exists and an issuer decides not to 
disclose, for example because of the difficulties in evaluating whether the criteria of inside 
information are met, an issuer exposes itself to the risk of being held liable ex post for 
breaching its disclosure duties254.    
Breaches of disclosure obligation may, in addition, cause criminal liability under the 
market manipulation provisions. As it was stated in chapter 2.2, prohibition on market 
manipulation has been enacted in order to prevent active misinformation, in other words 
lying. The market manipulation has been sanctioned in the sanctions directive Article 5(2), 
according to which disseminating information which gives false or misleading signals to 
the market may be exposed to criminal sanctions where the persons who made the 
dissemination derive for themselves or for another person an advantage or profit from the 
dissemination. As set out in the directive, intention of obtaining benefit is a prerequisite for 
a criminal liability. Therefore, by disclosing premature, incomplete or even misleading 
information, an issuer exposes itself to the risk of being held liable ex post for market 
manipulation255, if an intention of obtaining benefit can be proved. It is clear that the risk of 
criminal liability is particularly substantial in case of disseminating uncertain information: 
on the other hand an issuer is required to disclose uncertain information, but disclosing 
uncertain information may also be regarded as market manipulation, which leads to a clear 
paradox. Therefore, the interpretation of the criteria for delayed disclosure is of great 
significance: if the criteria are interpreted restrictively and the exemption is regarded 
applicable only in the most limited circumstances, an issuer's duty to disclose will be 
triggered at an earlier point of time and an issuer is forced to disseminate premature, 
incomplete or even misleading information. Such a restrictive interpretation exposes 
issuers to a substantial risk of being held liable for market manipulation.  
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As the breaches of disclosure duties may be sanctioned under the criminal law, either 
based on a criminal provision on breaches of disclosure obligation or on market 
manipulation, the principle of legality256 sets the limits for how far the definition of inside 
information, i.e. the concept defining the triggering point for disclosure, may be 
extended257. However, the principle of legality should also be taken into consideration 
when interpreting the criteria for delayed disclosure. Even if the breaches of delayed 
disclosure as such are only rarely sanctioned under the criminal law of Member States, the 
mechanism is closely linked to the disclosure obligation, which is more often subject to 
criminal sanctions258. If an issuer decides to delay disclosure and it is regarded ex post that 
the criteria for the delay were not met, such an act may be considered as a breach of 
disclosure obligation and result in criminal sanctions. In addition, the delay can be 
regarded as a protective measure against market manipulation. Therefore, the principle of 
legality should be taken into a consideration also when interpreting the criteria for delay. 
As the definition of inside information is about to extend after the MAR coming into force, 
at least in Members States applying a two-step model, the importance of the delayed 
disclosure mechanism as the ultimate safe harbour for the issuer will also increase and the 
interpretation of the criteria for delay should be extended accordingly. Therefore, it may be 
argued that the principle of legality should prevent too narrow an interpretation of the 
criteria for delayed disclosure; i.e. it should prevent an interpretation259 according to which 
the delayed disclosure mechanism would be applicable only in the most limited 
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circumstances and that would significantly extend the liability of an issuer and the risk of 
market manipulation charges.260  
The principle of legality should direct the interpretation of the definition of inside 
information and of the criteria for delayed disclosure in a way that is foreseeable from an 
individual's point of view. Therefore, a literal interpretation is the starting point for the 
interpretation. The principle of legality restricts an interpretation that extends an 
individual's liability, but however, it does not prevent adopting an interpretation that 
restricts such a liability.261 Therefore, an extending interpretation of the criteria of the 
delayed disclosure would be perfectly in line with the principle of legality. Ultimately, the 
principle of legality becomes concrete in a court decision-making. It should be given 
specific importance when the fulfilment of the criteria for delayed disclosure is considered 
within an individual case. If an issuer is capable of proving that the criteria for delayed 
disclosure were carefully considered and the delay was justified ex ante, it would be 
against the principle of legality for the court to adopt an unexpectedly restricted 
interpretation of the criteria to the detriment of the issuer. 
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5 BALANCING DISCLOSURE AND DELAYED DISCLOSURE  
5.1 Challenges of the regulation  
As the previous analysis has pointed out, the current EU disclosure regulation has a strong 
focus on protecting investor interests by extensive disclosure regulation. Investor 
protection is favoured even at the expense of issuer interests, and the focus on investor 
interests is even stronger as the MAR comes into force. It seems that the counter arguments 
for expanding disclosure regulation discussed in the economic literature and in chapter 2.3 
of this thesis have been ignored to a large degree if not altogether. No careful attention has 
either been paid to the principle of legality, which should set the ultimate limit for how far-
reaching the disclosure obligation of uncertain information may be.    
The regulator seems to have discarded the harm disclosure may cause to issuers and taken 
for granted that more information is better per se. The classical concept of homo 
economicus dominates in the MAR, and the restricted abilities of investors to process 
information have not been taken into consideration. Despite the exemption provided by 
delayed disclosure mechanism, no relevance has been given to the fact that protecting 
investors with too expansive disclosure regulation may actually end up harming investors 
and the entire market because of information overload and increasing information costs 
resulting from it262. Thus, increased investor protection does not result in corresponding 
market efficiency improvement, but there is a point where increased disclosure regulation 
turns against itself and actually ends up hampering the market efficacy. Therefore, investor 
and issuer interests are not completely opposite. The majority of economic literature 
clearly shows that balance should be tilted towards investor interests but not to such an 
extreme point where the MAR has gone. It is too late to take the mentioned arguments into 
consideration in the regulation, but the interpretation of the MAR is yet to develop and 
with market-based interpretation those arguments could be acknowledged.   
The clearest sign of the MAR's stricter disclosure regulation is the adoption of the one-step 
model of inside information which results in tendency towards increasing disclosure of 
uncertain information. The reality principal adopted in many Member States has been 
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rejected and replaced by the realistic prospect doctrine according to which the duty to 
disclose information may be triggered if there is a realistic prospect that the event will 
occur. Certainty of the occurrence is not required, nor a very high probability. At worst, the 
MAR may result in a flood of uncertain information to the market, which, in turn, would 
overwhelm investors and hamper market efficiency for sure. Further, a flood of uncertain 
information would lead to a spiral of correcting the information on and on again which 
would rather confuse than inform investors. The regulator has, however, recognised the 
risks of too extensive disclosure by providing the delayed disclosure mechanism 
(originally designed for very limited situations only) which offers an available solution to 
preventing the flood of uncertain information. However, it serves a solution only if the 
scope of delayed disclosure as an exemption rule is extended to the same degree as the 
disclosure obligation has been extended. 
Delayed disclosure mechanism can be described as a safe harbour to issuers, the access to 
which is regulated by the criteria discussed in the previous chapter263. Interpretation is the 
key to defining when the access to this safe harbour can be granted. Since the scope of the 
inside information and thus disclosure obligation is broad according to the MAR, virtually 
any new piece of information regarding issuer's business which shows a sufficient degree 
of preciseness and appears ex ante to be likely to have a significant price-effect amounts to 
inside information and must be disclosed. It is clear that issuer interests (and even investor 
or public interests) may support confidentiality of such information at least temporarily and 
especially when the information is of uncertain nature. In order for the delayed disclosure 
mechanism to offer a solution to problems caused by too extensive disclosure, a market-
based method should be used for interpreting the criteria for delayed disclosure. The 
purpose for the interpretation would be to find the optimal balance for disclosure and 
delayed disclosure that safeguards the investor interests but, at the same time, does not 
over-regulate disclosure, induce information overload, cause extensive information costs or 
discard issuer interests.   
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5.2 The available solution 
5.2.1 Emphasising legitimate interests and adopting reality principle 
In order to rationalise the current regulation and make sure that the delayed disclosure 
mechanism actually provides a safe harbour to issuers, the main attention should be 
focused on the legitimate interest criterion when evaluating the acceptability of the delay. 
As the Finnish legal literature has suggested264, the legitimate interest criterion should be 
regarded as the main criterion for delay and the other two, misleading and confidentiality 
criterion, should be considered as supplementary criteria. Consequently, the fulfilment of 
the criteria for delay would consist of evaluating whether the legitimate interest criterion is 
met and whether the legitimate interest is so important that it requires protection even at 
the expense of the misleading criterion. According to this approach, issuer interests should 
be weighed against investor interests in assessing whether the criteria are met, and this 
assessment should also define how much weight could be given to the misleading criterion. 
Thus, the misleading criterion could be superseded partially or, in limited situations, 
altogether, if the interests protected by the delay exceeded the importance of prompt 
disclosure. Following the described approach, the available solution discussed in this 
chapter concentrates on the legitimate interest criterion. The misleading criterion, on the 
other hand, is considered to set the boundaries on how far the legitimate interests of the 
issuer may be emphasised. The misleading criterion thus brings the investor protection 
point of view to the analysis. The confidentiality criterion, on the other, has been left 
outside the discussion and it has been assumed to be fulfilled from now on.  
When it comes to analysing legitimate interest criterion, it will be suggested to introduce 
the reality principle265 in the delayed disclosure context. Even though the reality principle 
has been rejected as a trigger to the duty to disclose, adopting the principle in the delayed 
disclosure context is still reasonable. Earlier, the reality principle was applied to restrict 
the duty to disclose and only the issuer was aware of the use of it i.e. the delay was 
“informal”. In the context of delayed disclosure the reality principle would define the 
access to delayed disclosure, which in turn requires informing authorities. Thus, the 
significant difference lies in the fact that an issuer must inform the competent authority 
                                                          
264
 See chapter 4.1.2. 
265
 The suggested reality principle would correspond to the Nordic reality principle discussed in chapter 3.1.3. By 
following the Nordic doctrine, the reality could be reached already before the formalization of an event (principle of 
reality rather than formality).   
59 (72) 
 
about the delay which prevents tendency to insider trading and enables more efficient and 
targeted monitoring of insider trading. In the next chapters an interpretation that takes into 
consideration the reality principle is suggested and discussed in the situations mentioned in 
the MAR, i.e. ongoing negotiations and multi-stage decision-making. The analysis is not 
meant to be exhaustive but instead it aims at highlighting elements that should be taken 
into account when interpreting the delayed disclosure provision.  
5.2.2 Ongoing negotiations     
Ongoing negotiations, both ordinary and financial recovery negotiations, are the first one 
of the situations mentioned in MAR preamble paragraph 50 where an issuer may have 
legitimate interest to delay disclosure of inside information266. Following the reality 
principle, the maturity (i.e. the degree of certainty) of inside information should be taken 
into consideration when interpreting the legitimate interest criterion, which would mean 
that the interpretation of the criterion would be different for uncertain and certain 
information. The criterion would be met more easily if the information was uncertain by 
nature. On the other hand, the delay would be permitted only in limited situation if the 
information was certain. However, when it comes to ongoing negotiations, evaluating the 
maturity of the information does not suffice but the accuracy (i.e. the degree of detail) of 
inside information should also be considered. The accuracy of inside information would 
mean dividing inside information into particular information and general information267. 
The criteria for delay would be met more easily if the inside information was particular by 
nature. On the other hand, the delay would be permitted only in limited situations if the 
inside information was general. The following chart illustrates the described approach268.    
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                 Chart 2. Disclosure and delayed disclosure of inside information regarding ongoing negotiations. 
The chart indicates that both the maturity and the accuracy of inside information should be 
taken into consideration when interpreting the legitimate interest criterion in the context of 
ongoing negotiations. The maturity of inside information is illustrated on the horizontal 
axis, where the reality principle is used to divide the inside information into uncertain and 
certain inside information. The MAR clearly depicts that also uncertain information of 
events or circumstances may constitute inside information and trigger duty to disclose, if 
there is a realistic prospect that the circumstances or events will occur, and that has been 
taken into consideration in the chart. The accuracy of inside information, on the other 
hand, is illustrated on the vertical axis. There, the inside information is divided into 
particular and general information. Particular information refers to details of a larger 
context. An example of this would be information regarding details of an important 
agreement that relates to company's acquisition negotiations. It may also relate to 
intermediate steps of a protracted process, which may constitute inside information 
according to the MAR. General information, on the other hand, refers to information 
regarding that context in total. For example, it may mean the goal or end point of a 
protracted process (e.g. acquisition process) or underlying reasons for certain actions (such 
actions being particular information of that context).  
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By combining the maturity and the accuracy of inside information, four different 
categories emerge where the interpretation of the legitimate interest criterion should differ. 
Firstly, if information is both uncertain and particular, delayed disclosure should be a 
principle. Such information includes so strong uncertainties that disclosing it could be 
misleading and, at worst, considered manipulative. At this point, issuer interests (and the 
market in general) to keep the information confidential should clearly overweight the 
investor interests to receive such speculative information269. Secondly, if the information is 
both certain and general, disclosure should be a principle. Delaying disclosure of such 
information would be misleading and it is hard to imagine what sort of issuer interest could 
legitimate the delay and overweight the investor interests in that information. In case of 
both certain and general information, both information regarding the context and details, as 
far as not published already earlier, should be disclosed exhaustively. For example, when a 
protracted process reaches an end point, an issuer should “come clean” about all inside 
information regarding that process.     
 Example 1. A listed medical company has been contacted by a potential research partner 
and promising negotiations regarding the suggested cooperation have been started. The 
cooperation would mean a completely new conquest for the issuer and a new strategic 
alignment, as well. However, the ongoing negotiations would be jeopardised by the 
disclosure. At this point the information is uncertain and particular, and the delay would be 
justified. However, quite soon the company should consider whether it should disclose the 
general information regarding the fact that the company is considering new strategic 
directions, even if the negotiations would have reached no concrete results yet.      
Example 2. A listed medical company has agreed and finalised negotiations regarding 
acquisition of three production plants. Earlier, the company has disclosed that a letter of 
intent regarding the acquisition was signed. At this point the information is general and 
certain. Now that the acquisition has been completed, also details of the acquisition should 
be disclosed.        
Thirdly, if inside information is general but uncertain, the general information should be 
disclosed, but details could be kept unpublished. In such a situation information might be 
so preliminary that actually no details would even exist yet. The uncertain and general 
inside information could regard e.g. issuer's plans, strategies, future targets or goals or 
impending developments. Uncertain and general inside information could also concern the 
fact that an issuer is aspiring for a certain goal but negotiations are carried out with several 
counterparties. No details of those negotiations would be mature enough to be disclosed, 
but at the same time delaying the disclosure of the general information of pursuing certain 
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goal could be misleading and therefore need to be disclosed. Fourthly, when inside 
information is particular but certain, the particular information and also the general context 
to which the particular information relates to, if it has not already been published, should 
principally be disclosed. However, if the legitimate interests of the issuer clearly 
overweigh the investor interests, publishing the general context to which the particular 
information relates could enable delaying disclosure of information that is particular and 
certain in exceptional circumstances. In such a case, the delay could be acceptable if 
investors can be considered to be sufficiently informed by the publication of the general 
information already indicating the main consequences of the particular information and the 
investors could thus not be considered to be truly misled270. 
 Example 3. A listed medical company is actively looking for a new research partner in 
order to start developing a new medicament for a purpose that has not been covered by its 
product range before, which would mean a new conquest for the company. At this point 
information is general but uncertain. Negotiations are ongoing with several potential 
partners, so no details of those should be disclosed and the disclosure of such facts could be 
delayed. However, the company should inform the market about its plans to expand on a 
new product market.        
 Example 4. A listed medical company has signed a letter of intent regarding an acquisition 
of three production plants. Before, the company has informed a market that it is about to 
start an investment program of new production facilities, but no details on this specific 
acquisition has been disclosed. At this point the information is particular but certain and the 
company should disclose the fact that such an agreement271 has been made and also that it 
is part of executing the mentioned investment program.                    
Ongoing negotiations are a good example of a protracted process where inside information 
may be formed in various phases of the process. Processes may also overlap in a way that 
several smaller processes form a larger entity (e.g. several investments that are related to 
an investment program). Several processes may also unite, a certain process may divide 
into multiple processes or a process may be interrupted and then continue again272. Further, 
the focus of the process may change during a certain process, e.g. an issuer may first be 
looking for a cooperation partner but then, as an opportunity arises, decide to acquire such 
a partner. Therefore disclosure related to a protracted process needs to be considered as an 
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 For such an argument, see also chapter 4.1.2 and case Metaleurop SA. 
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 However, a letter of intent may not always indicate that the main contract will certainly be made. Thus, it has been 
argued that the degree of certainty of a letter of intent should also be considered and it cannot be categorically stated that 
the disclosure of information regarding a letter of intent could never be delayed. For disclosure regarding letters of intent, 
see Häyrynen 2009, 78−80.     
272
 If the process has been interrupted, the disclosure has been delayed and the process will not continue, the inside 
information may remain unpublished for good. BaFin 2009, 63.    
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entity and previous publications may affect the need and content of future publications. For 
example, the need to come clean at the end of a protracted process may not include much 
new information, if the general intention of the process and particular negotiation results 
have already been published before. It is also possible, that during the same process the 
nature of the inside information (i.e. its accuracy and maturity) may vary or that at the 
same time there is inside information of varying maturity and accuracy and therefore the 
decision to delay or disclose might have to be evaluated multiple times during a certain 
process.    
When it comes to ongoing negotiation, an important difference between the ordinary and 
the financial recovery negotiations should be noticed. According to the MAR preamble 
paragraph 50 ordinary negotiations may entitle delay if those negotiations would be likely 
to be affected by disclosure whereas financial recovery negotiation may entitle delay where 
disclosure would seriously jeopardise the interest of existing and potential shareholders. 
Thus, according to the MAR the threshold for legitimate interests is lower for ordinary 
negotiations than for financial recovery negotiations i.e. the legitimate interest are 
protected more extensively in case of ordinary negotiation compared to financial recovery 
negotiations, where the misleading criterion has more emphasis. The maturity and 
accuracy of the information are still a relevant question in case of financial recovery 
negotiations, as the disclosure of general and certain information regarding the company's 
financial situation may generally not be delayed but the particular information (at least 
when uncertain) regarding the details of restructuring negotiations may be delayed273. As a 
consequence, the decision on whether the delay is acceptable in case of financial recovery 
negotiations requires extreme caution and the delay is possible in more limited 
circumstances compared to ordinary negotiations.274              
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 See also chapter 4.1.1 
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 However, the approach adopted in the MAR may be criticised. Let us imagine an issuer in financial distress who is 
having financial recovery negotiations on reorganising its debt and an issuer who is planning to expand its operations and 
having ordinary acquisitions negotiations. The legitimate interests to delay disclosure might actually be much greater in 
case an issuer is in trouble than in case an issuer is in a stable condition. Thus, it could be argued that information on the 
issuer's financial recovery negotiations should be considered a legitimate interest more easily than information on 
acquisition negotiation as the harm caused by disclosure may result in much more devastating outcomes (e.g. lead to 
insolvency) than in case of acquisition negotiations (e.g. lead only to a failure in negotiations, but not in devastating 
consequences for the issuer). Such argumentation collides however with the fact that information regarding the viability 
of an issuer is one of the most important areas of investor information, and thus investor protection strongly favours 
disclosure of such information (see also chapter 4.1.1).   
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5.2.3 Multi-stage decision-making 
Multi-stage decision-making is the second one of the mentioned situations in MAR 
preamble paragraph 50 where an issuer may delay disclosure. Multi-stage decision-making 
process differs significantly from the ongoing negotiations process. In a multi-stage 
decision-making process the question is about a certain decision which is confirmed by 
several steps. The maturity of the inside information is a crucial question also in this 
situation, and the reality principle should be applied to indicate when the inside 
information has become certain (even if not formalised) and when the delay would no 
longer be acceptable.  
However, the accuracy of the inside information is not relevant here. An example 
illustrates the said. If the inside information relates to the resigning of a CEO275, the 
information cannot be divided into particular and general. The information is therefore 
more simple and “undividable” as a contrast to the inside information regarding ongoing 
negotiations, where the information is dividable. Thus, the protracted process here relates 
to more or less same information (e.g. whether or not a CEO will resign or whether or not a 
certain decision will be approved by another body of an organisation) whereas in a 
negotiation process the information entity is more complex and several decisions may be 
done separately. It could also be argued that the ongoing negotiation process includes 
multiple pieces of inside information whereas the multi-stage decision-making process 
revolves around the same piece of inside information. The nature of the process thus 
differs and as the inside information is simpler, the evaluation of the delay and disclosure 
should also be simplified.     
5.2.4 Evaluation and limitations of the solution 
As the MAR preamble paragraph 50 indicates, the situations discussed in the two previous 
chapters are not meant for an exhaustive description of the circumstances in which the 
delay is possible. The Member States have also disagreed on whether delay should be 
acceptable in other situations. As the wording of the paragraph 50 indicates, the existence 
of such situations should not be denied. Thus the question raises on in what sort of 
situation the delay might also be possible. Should e.g. takeovers be treated differently from 
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 From this point of view, Daimler case (see supra note 125) was about a multi-stage decision-making process where 
the problematic question regarded the point of time when the information had become reality (even though not 
formalised) i.e. the maturity of the inside information.  
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ordinary negotiations because of their very price sensitive nature and special need for 
confidentiality and, on the other hand, the important risk related to insider trading? And 
how, on the other hand, impending developments regarding a certain condition, e.g. 
financial difficulties, should be regarded within the delayed disclosure context? Such 
questions276 will not be discussed further within this thesis, but they would require further 
research.         
As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the reality principle could be adopted in the 
delayed disclosure context both in case of ongoing negotiations and multi-stage decision-
making. Introducing the reality principle would have certain quite obvious benefits. Firstly, 
it would decrease significantly the flood of uncertain information to the market. It would 
reduce the amount of situations where investors would need to make a significant effort on 
evaluating the degree of the certainty of the information (and even then the uncertainty of 
whether the evaluation proves to be correct) and prevent issuer opportunism of 
disseminating uncertain information that would be beneficial to it277. Thus, it would 
decrease the general uncertainty related to the information in the markets that would be an 
inevitable consequence of a narrow interpretation of the delayed disclosure exemption. 
Secondly, it would aid scaling back disclosure (or keeping it relatively stable in Member 
States which already apply reality principle) which in turn would reduce information 
overload and information costs. Thirdly, it would take into consideration issuer interests in 
keeping especially uncertain matters and matters that are under preparation confidential.     
When it comes to the ongoing negotiations, evaluating the maturity of the information, i.e. 
applying the reality principle, does not suffice but the accuracy of the information should 
also be taken into consideration, which leads us to the categorisation described in chapter 
5.2.2. The categorisation should be taken as suggestive. The negotiation processes are 
often so complex that no definitive answer can be given on the relationship between 
disclosure and delayed disclosure. Thus, it is inevitable that the evaluation needs to be 
done taking into consideration the case specific circumstances278 even though it decreases 
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 In addition, the question of when disclosure itself is misleading or when disclosing only a part of inside information 
(e.g. a certain piece of particular inside information) without the context is misleading requires further research, since 
they have only been touched upon in this thesis (see chapter 4.1.1). The MAR recognises only the misleading potential of 
delayed disclosure but not of disclosure itself, which can be criticised.       
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 Though, an issuer would risk accuses of market manipulation in such a situation.  
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 E.g. the Finnish Supreme Court has emphasised such case-specific arguments, i.e. issuer's previous disclosure policy 
and line of business, in its recent rulings, e.g. case Perlos (especially sections 24 and 26). 
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the foreseeability of the regulation. Nevertheless, the categorisation helps analysing what 
sort of elements should be considered when evaluating the fulfilment of the criteria for 
delay. It also provides a fine classification of inside information by separating disclosure of 
certain and uncertain details and outcomes and thus enables warning of the impending 
developments which might not yet be certain.  
Even though the categorisation suggests that the criteria for delay should be met more 
easily if inside information is uncertain and/or particular compared to information that is 
certain and/or general, the final decision should always be made by weighting the 
conflicting principles of transparency and confidentiality against each other. Thus, the 
delay should be accepted when the harm caused by the disclosure exceeds the benefits of 
disclosure279. The categorisation assumes that harm exceeds benefits more easily in case of 
uncertain and/or particular information, but the final evaluation needs to be done taking 
into consideration the case-specific circumstances and also the disclosure policy of the 
issuer. Such case-specificity is an inevitable outcome of the regulation that is based on 
open standards and principles. Thus, at the end of the day, analysing such trade-offs is the 
task of an issuer (and, eventually, of a court), which might prove to be demanding since the 
issuer may naturally value its own interests over those of investors.      
When it comes to a multi-stage decision-making process, the evaluation of the legitimate 
interests criterion should be more straightforward. Here the legitimate interest to be 
protected is the autonomy of decision-making by a superior body and the delay should not 
apply to situations where the decision of another board is clear or only a formality. 
However, the analysis is not trouble-free here either, since evaluating at what point of time 
a decision has become a reality albeit not yet formalised may be difficult.280  
5.3 Practical implications 
Finally, the regulation of disclosure and delayed disclosure will also have some important 
practical implications. Firstly, finding the optimal balance for disclosure and delayed 
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 The view supported here suggests that a trade-off between issuer and investor interests should be taken into 
consideration (often such interests conflict, but sometimes they may also be parallel). ESMA has not adopted but neither 
rejected such an approach. Such an approach has, however, been adopted in Germany (see chapter 4.1.1.) and in Finland 
(see chapter 4.1.2). Further, it must be remembered, that in certain situation, i.e. recovery negotiations (see chapter 5.2.2), 
less emphasis is given on the legitimate interest of the issuer in the trade-off (i.e. the threshold for legitimate interests is 
higher than in case of ordinary negotiations).      
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 Daimler case is a good example of such difficulties. See supra note 125.  
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disclosure is of crucial significance to issuers. After the MAR has come into force, issuers 
will be required to disclose more information, and more uncertain information in 
particular, than ever. It is clear that the disclosure regulation has reached a point where, at 
least if the delayed disclosure exemption is interpreted narrowly, the legitimate interests of 
issuers are at danger and, at worst, issuers might be at risk for being accused of market 
manipulation by disclosing uncertain information which turns out being incorrect ex post. 
Should a permissive interpretation of the criteria for delayed disclosure be adopted, issuer 
interests could, however, be protected sufficiently.  
The most crucial challenge for issuers at the moment, however, might be the regulatory 
uncertainty related to the balance between disclosure and delayed disclosure. From an 
issuer's point of view, it would be important to come up with an established practice for the 
interpretation, whatever that finally is, which would be equally applied in all Member 
States and thus prevent regulatory arbitrage. Consequently, whether the adopted 
interpretation will favour issuers or not, all issuers would be on the same line and no issuer 
could benefit from a more lenient regulation. In any case, however, issuers must bear a 
certain uncertainty regarding the disclosure regulation as it consists of flexible standards 
that enable taking into consideration case-specific circumstances and issuer's individual 
disclosure policy281.         
Regardless of what the interpretation of the disclosure regulation will be in the future be, 
issuers must pay attention to carefully documenting the course of negotiations and 
decision-making processes. Increasing attention must be paid to administering delicate 
information and evaluating constantly when a certain piece of information may amount to 
inside information. As the delayed disclosure mechanism will become more regularly used, 
procedures need to be developed for deciding, handling and documenting delays and 
guaranteeing the confidentiality of information the disclosure of which has been delayed. 
In addition, attention must be paid to not to provide any indications which are 
contradictory to the undisclosed inside information. Further, disclosure procedures need to 
be streamlined in order to enable fast disclosure of even unexpected events and 
circumstances. As a consequence, information costs of the issuer will most certainly 
increase in the future.         
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 On the other hand, flexibility and taking into consideration case-specific circumstances is also a positive thing from an 
issuer's point of view.  
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The disclosure regulation of the MAR will inevitably demand more resources from the 
authorities. The MAR complicates the procedure for delayed disclosure as an issuer is 
required to inform the authority about the delay and a written explanation may also be 
required after the delayed information has been disclosed. Thus, adopting an expansive 
interpretation of the delayed disclosure will further increase delayed disclosure which will, 
in turn, result in subsequent administrative burden for authorities. At the same time, 
however, the new procedure should enable more efficient and targeted monitoring of 
insider trading as all cases of delayed disclosure should, at least in theory, come to the 
authorities' knowledge and the authorities will thus be better informed of where to look for 
the possible abuse of inside information. Thus, the increasing volume of delays should also 
make the monitoring more efficient.  
The disclosure regulation of the MAR will also require further guidance from authorities 
and possibly from the ECJ that clarify the concepts open to various interpretation, i.e. the 
criteria for inside information and delayed disclosure. While interpreting the regulation in 
individual cases, authorities and courts will probably face a difficult interpretation situation 
where, as a last resort, the principle of legality should protect the issuer from decisions 
where the unclear regulation would be interpreted to the detriment of the issuer and that 
would have been unforeseeable from the issuer's point of view.     
Expansive disclosure regulation should, on the other hand, provide increasingly extensive 
protection for investors. However, investors will face the risk of information overload. As 
the amount of information in the markets will increase, the capacity of investors to process 
the available information will be challenged. By adopting an expansive interpretation of 
the criteria for delay, destructive flood of uncertain information to the market could 
however be avoided. Resulting from increased information in the markets, the role of 
professional investors and informed traders, e.g. securities analysts, institutional investors, 
sophisticated individual investors and brokers, even though not protected from the 
information overload either, can be expected to further increase in the future. 
Consequently, the correct price assessment of issuer securities will greatly depend on their 
analysis and transactions. Further, increasing volumes of information will result in 
increased information costs to investor, too.      
In general, the MAR aims at more efficient and even fully transparent markets, which 
however is an unrealistic objective. The ideals of ECMH and homo economicus seem to 
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prevail in the current and future EU disclosure regulation, even though such a concept has 
been criticised for long. It is obvious that information is needed to enable efficient markets, 
but should the increased volume of information lead to information overload, increased 
information costs and overriding issuer interests, the increased disclosure will turn against 
itself and finally end up in less efficient markets.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this thesis was to find the optimal balance for disclosure and delayed 
disclosure and thus to solve the conflict of transparency and confidentiality by means of 
market-based interpretation that takes into consideration the economic theory of disclosure. 
Further, by means of comparative analysis, the thesis aimed at taking into consideration the 
national characteristics and the most appropriate practices of disclosure regulation adopted 
in the chosen Member States. On that basis the purpose was to find a “common ground” 
that would enable a pan-European interpretation of the criteria for delayed disclosure and 
that would be acceptable across Member States. 
The economic analysis of disclosure carried out in the second chapter pointed out the 
importance of information in reducing information asymmetries. It was discussed how 
disclosure serves as a solution to decreasing information asymmetries, improving 
efficiency, enhancing investor protection and addressing agency problems in the securities 
markets. On the other hand, the flip side of disclosure was also discussed. Issuer's right to 
proprietary information, information overload and information costs all support scaling 
back disclosure obligation that is today more far-reaching than ever before.   
The analysis of the current status of the EU disclosure regulation in chapter three indicated 
that the provisions of the MAD have been implemented in various ways in Member States 
and that the implementation approaches can be roughly divided into two categories, one-
step and two-step model of inside information. The practices and the use of the delayed 
disclosure mechanism also vary, as discussed in chapter four, but what seems to be 
common to all Member States is that all have strived for some alleviation in the 
implementation of the MAD, which shows that the MAD disclosure regime has been 
perceived too strict in practice. Nevertheless, the MAR continues the same regulatory path 
and aims at tightening the disclosure regulation by the adoption of the one-step model of 
inside information which results in tendency towards increasing disclosure of uncertain 
information. Counter-arguments for expanding disclosure have thus been surpassed.  
The delayed disclosure mechanism provides, however, a possible solution to alleviating the 
far-reaching disclosure obligation. In order to rationalise the regulation and make sure that 
the delayed disclosure mechanism actually provides a safe harbour to issuers, a broad 
interpretation of the criteria for delayed disclosure should be adopted. A market-based 
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solution to the interpretation was suggested in this thesis, the main idea of which can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, the main attention should be focused on the legitimate 
interests of an issuer when evaluating the acceptability of the delay and it should be 
considered the main criterion for delay, whereas misleading and confidentiality would 
serve supplementary criteria for delay preventing too far-reaching interference in the 
investor protection. Focusing on legitimate interests would enable balancing the conflicting 
interests of issuers and investors and evaluating the trade-off between benefits and harm 
accruing from disclosure. Should the harm caused by the disclosure exceed the benefits of 
disclosure, the misleading criteria should be set aside and the delay should be acceptable.  
When it comes to analysing the legitimate interest criterion, it was proposed to introduce 
the reality principle in the delayed disclosure context. A suggestive categorisation was also 
outlined to illustrate when the harm can be assumed to be greater than the benefits. Within 
the categorisation, adopting the reality principle would mean taking into consideration the 
maturity of the information when evaluating the acceptability of a delay. When it comes to 
ongoing negotiations, the accuracy of the information should be considered in addition to 
the maturity of the information, which enables separating disclosure of details and 
outcomes and thus disclosing a warning of impending developments without any details. 
Consequently, according to the categorisation, harm exceeds benefits more easily in case 
of uncertain and/or particular information compared to certain and/or general information, 
but the final evaluation needs to be done taking into consideration the case-specific 
circumstances and also the disclosure policy of the issuer. In case of multi-stage decision-
making, however, only the maturity of the information should be evaluated.      
By emphasising the legitimate issuer interests and adopting the reality principle in the 
delayed disclosure context several advantages could be obtained. A flood of uncertain 
information to the market could be prevented and scaling back disclosure could be enabled 
which, in turn, would reduce information overload and information costs. In addition, 
issuer interests in keeping especially uncertain matters and matters that are under 
preparation confidential could be taken into consideration and the worst, issuer's increased 
risk of liability for market manipulation, could be prevented. 
By nature, delayed disclosure provision is an exemption rule. A broad interpretation 
would, however, extend the applicability of the exemption significantly almost to such an 
extent that delayed disclosure would become a principle rule or, at least, a widely applied 
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exemption. As this thesis has pointed out, keeping uncertain matters confidential is often 
not only in the interest of an issuer but also in the interest of investors and markets. Thus, 
transparency and confidentiality do not always collide, and, if they do, issuer interests 
should not be superseded by investor interests in such extensity as the literal interpretation 
of the MAR would indicate. The MAR has evidently gone a step too far in its disclosure 
regulation, and alleviating the regulation by a more lenient interpretation is needed despite 
the fact that the exemption nature of the delayed disclosure provision then needs to be 
compromised. To find the optimal balance between disclosure and delayed disclosure, 
adopting a broad interpretation is thus inevitable. 
Finding the optimal balance between disclosure and delayed disclosure is important also 
from the point of view of the EU securities market regulation in general. Unlike the MAD, 
the MAR has been enacted as a regulation and it will be directly applicable in all Member 
States. The MAR is supposed to deepen the harmonization of the EU securities market 
regulation. In order to reach such a harmonization, a pan-European interpretation of the 
disclosure regulation is indispensable. Pan-European interpretation is also needed to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage and uncertainty related to the regulation. If a consistent interpretation 
is not reached, substantial discretion is left to the Member States and inconsistences are 
highly likely in the future as well.                 
 
 
